From delphij at FreeBSD.org  Tue Apr  8 18:27:49 2014
From: delphij at FreeBSD.org (Xin LI)
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 18:27:47 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: svn commit: r264267 - in releng/10.0: . crypto/openssl/crypto/bn
 crypto/openssl/crypto/ec crypto/openssl/ssl sys/conf sys/fs/nfsserver
Message-ID: <201404081827.s38IRlGS049095@svn.freebsd.org>

Author: delphij
Date: Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014
New Revision: 264267
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/264267

Log:
  Fix NFS deadlock vulnerability. [SA-14:05]
  
  Fix "Heartbleed" vulnerability and ECDSA Cache Side-channel
  Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
  
  Approved by:    so

Modified:
  releng/10.0/UPDATING
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
  releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/10.0/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c

Modified: releng/10.0/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITH
 stable/10, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process from
 older version of current is a bit fragile.
 
+20140408:	p1	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
+	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]
+
+	Fix multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
+
 20131223:
 	The behavior of gss_pseudo_random() for the krb5 mechanism
 	has changed, for applications requesting a longer random string

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -208,11 +208,15 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
 	return ret;
 	}
 
+
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -246,6 +250,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -270,16 +279,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 		word = scalar->d[i];
 		while (mask)
 			{
-			if (word & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		mask = BN_TBIT;

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -1458,26 +1458,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	unsigned int payload;
 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	pl = p;
-
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+	pl = p;
+
 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
 		{
 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+					    2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+					    payload + padding;
 		int r;
 
+		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+
 		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
 		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
 		 * payload, plus padding
 		 */
-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
 		bp = buffer;
 
 		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1488,11 +1498,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 		/* Random padding */
 		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
 
-		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
 
 		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+				buffer, write_length,
 				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
 		OPENSSL_free(buffer);

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -2486,16 +2486,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	unsigned int payload;
 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	pl = p;
-
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+	pl = p;
+
 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
 		{
 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;

Modified: releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="10.0"
-BRANCH="RELEASE"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p1"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/10.0/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:39 2014	(r264266)
+++ releng/10.0/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 18:27:46 2014	(r264267)
@@ -1457,10 +1457,23 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Unlock dp in this code section, so it is unlocked before
+	 * tdp gets locked. This avoids a potential LOR if tdp is the
+	 * parent directory of dp.
+	 */
 	if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
 		tdp = todp;
 		tnes = *toexp;
-		tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred, p, 0);
+		if (dp != tdp) {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 0);	/* Might lock tdp. */
+		} else {
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		tfh.nfsrvfh_len = 0;
 		error = nfsrv_mtofh(nd, &tfh);
@@ -1481,10 +1494,12 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 			tnes = *exp;
 			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
 			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 		} else {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 			nd->nd_cred->cr_uid = nd->nd_saveduid;
 			nfsd_fhtovp(nd, &tfh, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &tdp, &tnes, NULL,
-			    0, p);
+			    0, p);	/* Locks tdp. */
 			if (tdp) {
 				tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor,
 				    nd->nd_cred, p, 1);
@@ -1499,7 +1514,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		if (error) {
 			if (tdp)
 				vrele(tdp);
-			vput(dp);
+			vrele(dp);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 			goto out;
@@ -1514,7 +1529,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		}
 		if (tdp)
 			vrele(tdp);
-		vput(dp);
+		vrele(dp);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 		goto out;
@@ -1523,7 +1538,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 	/*
 	 * Done parsing, now down to business.
 	 */
-	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 1, exp, p, &fdirp);
+	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 0, exp, p, &fdirp);
 	if (nd->nd_repstat) {
 		if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV3) {
 			nfsrv_wcc(nd, fdirfor_ret, &fdirfor, fdiraft_ret,

From delphij at FreeBSD.org  Tue Apr  8 23:16:11 2014
From: delphij at FreeBSD.org (Xin LI)
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 23:16:05 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: svn commit: r264284 - in releng: 8.3 8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn
 8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec 8.3/sys/conf 8.3/sys/fs/nfsserver 8.4
 8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn 8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec 8.4/sy...
Message-ID: <201404082316.s38NG5mu068730@svn.freebsd.org>

Author: delphij
Date: Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014
New Revision: 264284
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/264284

Log:
  Fix NFS deadlock vulnerability. [SA-14:05]
  
  Fix ECDSA Cache Side-channel Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
  
  Approved by:    so

Modified:
  releng/8.3/UPDATING
  releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
  releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
  releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
  releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/8.3/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
  releng/8.4/UPDATING
  releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
  releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
  releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
  releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/8.4/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
  releng/9.1/UPDATING
  releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
  releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
  releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
  releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/9.1/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
  releng/9.2/UPDATING
  releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
  releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
  releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
  releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/9.2/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c

Modified: releng/8.3/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 8.
 	debugging tools present in HEAD were left in place because
 	sun4v support still needs work to become production ready.
 
+20140408:	p15	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
+	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]
+
+	Fix for ECDSA Cache Side-channel Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
+
 20140114:	p14	FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind

Modified: releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

Modified: releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

Modified: releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

Modified: releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="8.3"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p14"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p15"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/8.3/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.3/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -1446,10 +1446,23 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Unlock dp in this code section, so it is unlocked before
+	 * tdp gets locked. This avoids a potential LOR if tdp is the
+	 * parent directory of dp.
+	 */
 	if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
 		tdp = todp;
 		tnes = *toexp;
-		tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred, p, 0);
+		if (dp != tdp) {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 0);	/* Might lock tdp. */
+		} else {
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		tfh.nfsrvfh_len = 0;
 		error = nfsrv_mtofh(nd, &tfh);
@@ -1470,10 +1483,12 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 			tnes = *exp;
 			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
 			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 		} else {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 			nd->nd_cred->cr_uid = nd->nd_saveduid;
 			nfsd_fhtovp(nd, &tfh, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &tdp, &tnes, NULL,
-			    0, p);
+			    0, p);	/* Locks tdp. */
 			if (tdp) {
 				tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor,
 				    nd->nd_cred, p, 1);
@@ -1488,7 +1503,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		if (error) {
 			if (tdp)
 				vrele(tdp);
-			vput(dp);
+			vrele(dp);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 			goto out;
@@ -1503,7 +1518,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		}
 		if (tdp)
 			vrele(tdp);
-		vput(dp);
+		vrele(dp);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 		goto out;
@@ -1512,7 +1527,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 	/*
 	 * Done parsing, now down to business.
 	 */
-	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 1, exp, p, &fdirp);
+	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 0, exp, p, &fdirp);
 	if (nd->nd_repstat) {
 		if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV3) {
 			nfsrv_wcc(nd, fdirfor_ret, &fdirfor, fdiraft_ret,

Modified: releng/8.4/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 8.
 	debugging tools present in HEAD were left in place because
 	sun4v support still needs work to become production ready.
 
+20140408:	p8	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
+	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]
+
+	Fix for ECDSA Cache Side-channel Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
+
 20140114:	p7	FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind

Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

Modified: releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

Modified: releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="8.4"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p7"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p8"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/8.4/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/8.4/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -1446,10 +1446,23 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Unlock dp in this code section, so it is unlocked before
+	 * tdp gets locked. This avoids a potential LOR if tdp is the
+	 * parent directory of dp.
+	 */
 	if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
 		tdp = todp;
 		tnes = *toexp;
-		tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred, p, 0);
+		if (dp != tdp) {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 0);	/* Might lock tdp. */
+		} else {
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		tfh.nfsrvfh_len = 0;
 		error = nfsrv_mtofh(nd, &tfh);
@@ -1470,10 +1483,12 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 			tnes = *exp;
 			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
 			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 		} else {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 			nd->nd_cred->cr_uid = nd->nd_saveduid;
 			nfsd_fhtovp(nd, &tfh, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &tdp, &tnes, NULL,
-			    0, p);
+			    0, p);	/* Locks tdp. */
 			if (tdp) {
 				tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor,
 				    nd->nd_cred, p, 1);
@@ -1488,7 +1503,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		if (error) {
 			if (tdp)
 				vrele(tdp);
-			vput(dp);
+			vrele(dp);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 			goto out;
@@ -1503,7 +1518,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		}
 		if (tdp)
 			vrele(tdp);
-		vput(dp);
+		vrele(dp);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 		goto out;
@@ -1512,7 +1527,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 	/*
 	 * Done parsing, now down to business.
 	 */
-	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 1, exp, p, &fdirp);
+	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 0, exp, p, &fdirp);
 	if (nd->nd_repstat) {
 		if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV3) {
 			nfsrv_wcc(nd, fdirfor_ret, &fdirfor, fdiraft_ret,

Modified: releng/9.1/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@ handbook.
 Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running portupgrade.
 
+20140408:	p11	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
+	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]
+
+	Fix for ECDSA Cache Side-channel Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
+
 20140114:	p10	FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind

Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

Modified: releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

Modified: releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="9.1"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p10"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p11"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/9.1/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.1/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -1446,10 +1446,23 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Unlock dp in this code section, so it is unlocked before
+	 * tdp gets locked. This avoids a potential LOR if tdp is the
+	 * parent directory of dp.
+	 */
 	if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
 		tdp = todp;
 		tnes = *toexp;
-		tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred, p, 0);
+		if (dp != tdp) {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 0);	/* Might lock tdp. */
+		} else {
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		tfh.nfsrvfh_len = 0;
 		error = nfsrv_mtofh(nd, &tfh);
@@ -1470,10 +1483,12 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 			tnes = *exp;
 			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
 			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 		} else {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 			nd->nd_cred->cr_uid = nd->nd_saveduid;
 			nfsd_fhtovp(nd, &tfh, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &tdp, &tnes, NULL,
-			    0, p);
+			    0, p);	/* Locks tdp. */
 			if (tdp) {
 				tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor,
 				    nd->nd_cred, p, 1);
@@ -1488,7 +1503,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		if (error) {
 			if (tdp)
 				vrele(tdp);
-			vput(dp);
+			vrele(dp);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 			goto out;
@@ -1503,7 +1518,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		}
 		if (tdp)
 			vrele(tdp);
-		vput(dp);
+		vrele(dp);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 		goto out;
@@ -1512,7 +1527,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 	/*
 	 * Done parsing, now down to business.
 	 */
-	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 1, exp, p, &fdirp);
+	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 0, exp, p, &fdirp);
 	if (nd->nd_repstat) {
 		if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV3) {
 			nfsrv_wcc(nd, fdirfor_ret, &fdirfor, fdiraft_ret,

Modified: releng/9.2/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/UPDATING	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ handbook:
 Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running portupgrade.
 
+20140408:	p4	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
+	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]
+
+	Fix for ECDSA Cache Side-channel Attack in OpenSSL. [SA-14:06]
+
 20140114:	p3	FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind

Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

Modified: releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

Modified: releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="9.2"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p3"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p4"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/9.2/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 22:36:39 2014	(r264283)
+++ releng/9.2/sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdserv.c	Tue Apr  8 23:16:05 2014	(r264284)
@@ -1457,10 +1457,23 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Unlock dp in this code section, so it is unlocked before
+	 * tdp gets locked. This avoids a potential LOR if tdp is the
+	 * parent directory of dp.
+	 */
 	if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
 		tdp = todp;
 		tnes = *toexp;
-		tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred, p, 0);
+		if (dp != tdp) {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 0);	/* Might lock tdp. */
+		} else {
+			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
+			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
+		}
 	} else {
 		tfh.nfsrvfh_len = 0;
 		error = nfsrv_mtofh(nd, &tfh);
@@ -1481,10 +1494,12 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 			tnes = *exp;
 			tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor, nd->nd_cred,
 			    p, 1);
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 		} else {
+			NFSVOPUNLOCK(dp, 0);
 			nd->nd_cred->cr_uid = nd->nd_saveduid;
 			nfsd_fhtovp(nd, &tfh, LK_EXCLUSIVE, &tdp, &tnes, NULL,
-			    0, p);
+			    0, p);	/* Locks tdp. */
 			if (tdp) {
 				tdirfor_ret = nfsvno_getattr(tdp, &tdirfor,
 				    nd->nd_cred, p, 1);
@@ -1499,7 +1514,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		if (error) {
 			if (tdp)
 				vrele(tdp);
-			vput(dp);
+			vrele(dp);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 			nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 			goto out;
@@ -1514,7 +1529,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 		}
 		if (tdp)
 			vrele(tdp);
-		vput(dp);
+		vrele(dp);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&fromnd);
 		nfsvno_relpathbuf(&tond);
 		goto out;
@@ -1523,7 +1538,7 @@ nfsrvd_rename(struct nfsrv_descript *nd,
 	/*
 	 * Done parsing, now down to business.
 	 */
-	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 1, exp, p, &fdirp);
+	nd->nd_repstat = nfsvno_namei(nd, &fromnd, dp, 0, exp, p, &fdirp);
 	if (nd->nd_repstat) {
 		if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV3) {
 			nfsrv_wcc(nd, fdirfor_ret, &fdirfor, fdiraft_ret,

From delphij at FreeBSD.org  Wed Apr 30 04:04:43 2014
From: delphij at FreeBSD.org (Xin LI)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 04:04:42 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: svn commit: r265124 - in releng/10.0: . crypto/openssl/ssl
 etc/defaults sys/conf sys/netinet
Message-ID: <201404300404.s3U44gdH014256@svn.freebsd.org>

Author: delphij
Date: Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014
New Revision: 265124
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/265124

Log:
  Fix devfs rules not applied by default for jails.
  
  Fix OpenSSL use-after-free vulnerability.
  
  Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability.
  
  Security:	FreeBSD-SA-14:07.devfs
  Security:	CVE-2014-3001
  Security:	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
  Security:	CVE-2014-3000
  Security:	FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl
  Security:	CVE-2010-5298
  Approved by:	so

Modified:
  releng/10.0/UPDATING
  releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
  releng/10.0/etc/defaults/rc.conf
  releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/10.0/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c

Modified: releng/10.0/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:20 2014	(r265123)
+++ releng/10.0/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITH
 stable/10, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process from
 older version of current is a bit fragile.
 
+20140430:	p2	FreeBSD-SA-14:07.devfs
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
+			FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl
+
+	Fix devfs rules not applied by default for jails. [SA-14:07]
+
+	Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability. [SA-14:08]
+
+	Fix OpenSSL use-after-free vulnerability. [SA-14:09]
+
 20140408:	p1	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
 	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]

Modified: releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:20 2014	(r265123)
+++ releng/10.0/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ start:
 				{
 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
 				rr->off=0;
-				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
 					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
 				}
 			}

Modified: releng/10.0/etc/defaults/rc.conf
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/etc/defaults/rc.conf	Wed Apr 30 04:04:20 2014	(r265123)
+++ releng/10.0/etc/defaults/rc.conf	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ devfs_rulesets="/etc/defaults/devfs.rule
 devfs_system_ruleset=""	# The name (NOT number) of a ruleset to apply to /dev
 devfs_set_rulesets=""	# A list of /mount/dev=ruleset_name settings to
 			# apply (must be mounted already, i.e. fstab(5))
-devfs_load_rulesets="NO"	# Enable to always load the default rulesets
+devfs_load_rulesets="YES"	# Enable to always load the default rulesets
 performance_cx_lowest="HIGH"	# Online CPU idle state
 performance_cpu_freq="NONE"	# Online CPU frequency
 economy_cx_lowest="HIGH"	# Offline CPU idle state

Modified: releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:20 2014	(r265123)
+++ releng/10.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="10.0"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p1"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p2"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/10.0/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/10.0/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:20 2014	(r265123)
+++ releng/10.0/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 * Investigate why and re-evaluate the below limit after the behaviour
 	 * is understood.
 	 */
-	if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
+	if ((th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
 	    tp->t_segqlen >= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / tp->t_maxseg) + 1) {
 		V_tcp_reass_overflows++;
 		TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 */
 	te = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_reass_zone, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (te == NULL) {
-		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
+		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) {
 			TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
 			m_freem(m);
 			*tlenp = 0;
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 				TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvduppack);
 				TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_rcvdupbyte, *tlenp);
 				m_freem(m);
-				uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
+				if (te != &tqs)
+					uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
 				tp->t_segqlen--;
 				/*
 				 * Try to present any queued data

From delphij at FreeBSD.org  Wed Apr 30 04:05:50 2014
From: delphij at FreeBSD.org (Xin LI)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 04:05:48 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: svn commit: r265125 - in releng: 8.3 8.3/sys/conf 8.3/sys/netinet 8.4
 8.4/sys/conf 8.4/sys/netinet 9.1 9.1/sys/conf 9.1/sys/netinet 9.2
 9.2/sys/conf 9.2/sys/netinet
Message-ID: <201404300405.s3U45mtu014533@svn.freebsd.org>

Author: delphij
Date: Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014
New Revision: 265125
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/265125

Log:
  Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability.
  
  Security:	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
  Security:	CVE-2014-3000
  Approved by:	so

Modified:
  releng/8.3/UPDATING
  releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/8.3/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
  releng/8.4/UPDATING
  releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/8.4/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
  releng/9.1/UPDATING
  releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/9.1/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
  releng/9.2/UPDATING
  releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh
  releng/9.2/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c

Modified: releng/8.3/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.3/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 8.
 	debugging tools present in HEAD were left in place because
 	sun4v support still needs work to become production ready.
 
+20140430:	p16	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
+
+        Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability. [SA-14:08]
+
 20140408:	p15	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
 	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]

Modified: releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="8.3"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p15"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p16"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/8.3/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.3/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.3/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 * Investigate why and re-evaluate the below limit after the behaviour
 	 * is understood.
 	 */
-	if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
+	if ((th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
 	    tp->t_segqlen >= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / tp->t_maxseg) + 1) {
 		V_tcp_reass_overflows++;
 		TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 */
 	te = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_reass_zone, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (te == NULL) {
-		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
+		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) {
 			TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
 			m_freem(m);
 			*tlenp = 0;
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 				TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvduppack);
 				TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_rcvdupbyte, *tlenp);
 				m_freem(m);
-				uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
+				if (te != &tqs)
+					uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
 				tp->t_segqlen--;
 				/*
 				 * Try to present any queued data

Modified: releng/8.4/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.4/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 8.
 	debugging tools present in HEAD were left in place because
 	sun4v support still needs work to become production ready.
 
+20140430:	p9	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
+
+        Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability. [SA-14:08]
+
 20140408:	p8	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
 	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]

Modified: releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="8.4"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p8"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p9"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/8.4/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/8.4/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/8.4/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 * Investigate why and re-evaluate the below limit after the behaviour
 	 * is understood.
 	 */
-	if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
+	if ((th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
 	    tp->t_segqlen >= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / tp->t_maxseg) + 1) {
 		V_tcp_reass_overflows++;
 		TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 */
 	te = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_reass_zone, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (te == NULL) {
-		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
+		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) {
 			TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
 			m_freem(m);
 			*tlenp = 0;
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 				TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvduppack);
 				TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_rcvdupbyte, *tlenp);
 				m_freem(m);
-				uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
+				if (te != &tqs)
+					uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
 				tp->t_segqlen--;
 				/*
 				 * Try to present any queued data

Modified: releng/9.1/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.1/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ handbook.
 Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running portupgrade.
 
+20140430:	p12	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
+
+        Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability. [SA-14:08]
+
 20140408:	p11	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
 	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]

Modified: releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="9.1"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p11"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p12"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/9.1/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.1/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.1/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 * Investigate why and re-evaluate the below limit after the behaviour
 	 * is understood.
 	 */
-	if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
+	if ((th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
 	    tp->t_segqlen >= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / tp->t_maxseg) + 1) {
 		V_tcp_reass_overflows++;
 		TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 */
 	te = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_reass_zone, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (te == NULL) {
-		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
+		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) {
 			TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
 			m_freem(m);
 			*tlenp = 0;
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 				TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvduppack);
 				TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_rcvdupbyte, *tlenp);
 				m_freem(m);
-				uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
+				if (te != &tqs)
+					uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
 				tp->t_segqlen--;
 				/*
 				 * Try to present any queued data

Modified: releng/9.2/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.2/UPDATING	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ handbook:
 Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in
 /usr/ports/UPDATING.  Please read that file before running portupgrade.
 
+20140430:	p5	FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
+
+        Fix TCP reassembly vulnerability. [SA-14:08]
+
 20140408:	p4	FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
 			FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
 	Fix deadlock in the NFS server. [SA-14:05]

Modified: releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="9.2"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p4"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p5"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi

Modified: releng/9.2/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c
==============================================================================
--- releng/9.2/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:04:42 2014	(r265124)
+++ releng/9.2/sys/netinet/tcp_reass.c	Wed Apr 30 04:05:47 2014	(r265125)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 * Investigate why and re-evaluate the below limit after the behaviour
 	 * is understood.
 	 */
-	if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
+	if ((th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
 	    tp->t_segqlen >= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / tp->t_maxseg) + 1) {
 		V_tcp_reass_overflows++;
 		TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 	 */
 	te = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_reass_zone, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (te == NULL) {
-		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt) {
+		if (th->th_seq != tp->rcv_nxt || !TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) {
 			TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvmemdrop);
 			m_freem(m);
 			*tlenp = 0;
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ tcp_reass(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphd
 				TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_rcvduppack);
 				TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_rcvdupbyte, *tlenp);
 				m_freem(m);
-				uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
+				if (te != &tqs)
+					uma_zfree(V_tcp_reass_zone, te);
 				tp->t_segqlen--;
 				/*
 				 * Try to present any queued data