svn commit: r494948 - head/security/john/files

[Alexey Dokuchaev]

Author: danfe
Date: Thu Mar  7 14:09:35 2019
New Revision: 494948
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/494948

Log:
  Unbreak GPG format plugin against newer versions of OpenSSL.
  
  Obtained from:	https://github.com/magnumripper/JohnTheRipper/commit/c0557e7

Added:
  head/security/john/files/patch-gpg__fmt__plug.c   (contents, props changed)

Added: head/security/john/files/patch-gpg__fmt__plug.c
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/security/john/files/patch-gpg__fmt__plug.c	Thu Mar  7 14:09:35 2019	(r494948)
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+--- gpg_fmt_plug.c.orig	2014-12-18 07:59:02 UTC
++++ gpg_fmt_plug.c
+@@ -930,8 +930,12 @@ static int check_dsa_secret_key(DSA *dsa)
+ {
+ 	int error;
+ 	int rc = -1;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
++	const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
++#endif
+ 	BIGNUM *res = BN_new();
+ 	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
++
+ 	if (!res) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "failed to allocate result BN in check_dsa_secret_key()\n");
+ 		exit(-1);
+@@ -941,23 +945,35 @@ static int check_dsa_secret_key(DSA *dsa)
+ 		exit(-1);
+ 	}
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
++	DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
++	DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
++	error = BN_mod_exp(res, g, priv_key, p, ctx);
++#else
+ 	error = BN_mod_exp(res, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx);
++#endif
++
+ 	if ( error == 0 ) {
+ 		goto freestuff;
+ 	}
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
++	rc = BN_cmp(res, pub_key);
++#else
+ 	rc = BN_cmp(res, dsa->pub_key);
++#endif
+ 
+ freestuff:
+ 
+ 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	BN_free(res);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+ 	BN_free(dsa->g);
+ 	BN_free(dsa->q);
+ 	BN_free(dsa->p);
+ 	BN_free(dsa->pub_key);
+ 	BN_free(dsa->priv_key);
+-
++#endif
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1212,9 +1228,7 @@ static int check(unsigned char *keydata, int ks)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		if (blen < cur_salt->datalen && ((b = BN_bin2bn(out + 2, blen, NULL)) != NULL)) {
+ 			char *str = BN_bn2hex(b);
+-			DSA dsa;
+-			ElGamal_secret_key elg;
+-			RSA_secret_key rsa;
++
+ 			if (strlen(str) != blen * 2) { /* verifier 2 */
+ 				OPENSSL_free(str);
+ 				return 0;
+@@ -1222,6 +1236,28 @@ static int check(unsigned char *keydata, int ks)
+ 			OPENSSL_free(str);
+ 
+ 			if (cur_salt->pk_algorithm == 17) { /* DSA check */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
++				DSA *dsa = DSA_new();
++				BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
++
++				p = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->p, cur_salt->pl, NULL);
++				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.p));
++				q = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->q, cur_salt->ql, NULL);
++				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.q));
++				g = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->g, cur_salt->gl, NULL);
++				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.g));
++				priv_key = b;
++				pub_key = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->y, cur_salt->yl, NULL);
++
++				DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g);
++				DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key);
++
++				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.pub_key));
++				ret = check_dsa_secret_key(dsa); /* verifier 3 */
++				DSA_free(dsa);
++#else
++				DSA dsa;
++
+ 				dsa.p = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->p, cur_salt->pl, NULL);
+ 				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.p));
+ 				dsa.q = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->q, cur_salt->ql, NULL);
+@@ -1232,10 +1268,13 @@ static int check(unsigned char *keydata, int ks)
+ 				dsa.pub_key = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->y, cur_salt->yl, NULL);
+ 				// puts(BN_bn2hex(dsa.pub_key));
+ 				ret = check_dsa_secret_key(&dsa); /* verifier 3 */
++#endif
+ 				if (ret != 0)
+ 					return 0;
+ 			}
+ 			if (cur_salt->pk_algorithm == 16 || cur_salt->pk_algorithm == 20) { /* ElGamal check */
++				ElGamal_secret_key elg;
++
+ 				elg.p = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->p, cur_salt->pl, NULL);
+ 				// puts(BN_bn2hex(elg.p));
+ 				elg.g = BN_bin2bn(cur_salt->g, cur_salt->gl, NULL);
+@@ -1249,8 +1288,10 @@ static int check(unsigned char *keydata, int ks)
+ 					return 0;
+ 			}
+ 			if (cur_salt->pk_algorithm == 1) { /* RSA check */
++				RSA_secret_key rsa;
+ 				// http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt
+ 				int length = 0;
++
+ 				length += give_multi_precision_integer(out, length, &cur_salt->dl, cur_salt->d);
+ 				length += give_multi_precision_integer(out, length, &cur_salt->pl, cur_salt->p);
+ 				length += give_multi_precision_integer(out, length, &cur_salt->ql, cur_salt->q);