svn commit: r413349 - head/security/vuxml

Guido Falsi madpilot at FreeBSD.org
Fri Apr 15 15:12:47 UTC 2016


Author: madpilot
Date: Fri Apr 15 15:12:45 2016
New Revision: 413349
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/413349

Log:
  Document Asterisk and PJsip vulnerabilities.

Modified:
  head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml

Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Fri Apr 15 14:28:44 2016	(r413348)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml	Fri Apr 15 15:12:45 2016	(r413349)
@@ -58,6 +58,83 @@ Notes:
   * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.)
 -->
 <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+  <vuln vid="e21474c6-031a-11e6-aa86-001999f8d30b">
+    <topic>PJSIP -- TCP denial of service in PJProject</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>pjsip</name>
+	<range><le>2.4.5</le></range>
+      </package>
+      <package>
+	<name>pjsip-extsrtp</name>
+	<range><le>2.4.5</le></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+	<p>The Asterisk project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories">
+	  <p>PJProject has a limit on the number of TCP connections
+	  that it can accept. Furthermore, PJProject does not close
+	  TCP connections it accepts. By default, this value is
+	  approximately 60.</p>
+	  <p>An attacker can deplete the number of allowed TCP
+	  connections by opening TCP connections and sending no
+	  data to Asterisk.</p>
+	  <p>If PJProject has been compiled in debug mode, then
+	  once the number of allowed TCP connections has been
+	  depleted, the next attempted TCP connection to Asterisk
+	  will crash due to an assertion in PJProject.</p>
+	  <p>If PJProject has not been compiled in debug mode, then
+	  any further TCP connection attempts will be rejected.
+	  This makes Asterisk unable to process TCP SIP traffic.</p>
+	  <p>Note that this only affects TCP/TLS, since UDP is
+	  connectionless.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <url>http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-005.html</url>
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2016-02-15</discovery>
+      <entry>2016-04-15</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
+  <vuln vid="ee50726e-0319-11e6-aa86-001999f8d30b">
+    <topic>asterisk -- Long Contact URIs in REGISTER requests can crash Asterisk</topic>
+    <affects>
+      <package>
+	<name>asterisk13</name>
+	<range><lt>13.8.1</lt></range>
+      </package>
+    </affects>
+    <description>
+      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+	<p>The Asterisk project reports:</p>
+	<blockquote cite="http://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories">
+	  <p>Asterisk may crash when processing an incoming REGISTER
+	  request if that REGISTER contains a Contact header with
+	  a lengthy URI.</p>
+	  <p>This crash will only happen for requests that pass
+	  authentication. Unauthenticated REGISTER requests will
+	  not result in a crash occurring.</p>
+	  <p>This vulnerability only affects Asterisk when using
+	  PJSIP as its SIP stack. The chan_sip module does not have
+	  this problem.</p>
+	</blockquote>
+      </body>
+    </description>
+    <references>
+      <url>http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-004.html</url>
+    </references>
+    <dates>
+      <discovery>2016-01-19</discovery>
+      <entry>2016-04-15</entry>
+    </dates>
+  </vuln>
+
   <vuln vid="f2217cdf-01e4-11e6-b1ce-002590263bf5">
     <topic>go -- remote denial of service</topic>
     <affects>


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