svn commit: r404076 - head/security/vuxml
Roman Bogorodskiy
novel at FreeBSD.org
Sun Dec 20 23:45:00 UTC 2015
Author: novel
Date: Sun Dec 20 23:44:59 2015
New Revision: 404076
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/404076
Log:
Document libvirt vulnerability
Security: CVE-2015-5313
Modified:
head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Dec 20 23:37:30 2015 (r404075)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Sun Dec 20 23:44:59 2015 (r404076)
@@ -58,6 +58,54 @@ Notes:
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+ <vuln vid="f714b4c9-a6c1-11e5-88d7-047d7b492d07">
+ <topic>libvirt -- ACL bypass using ../ to access beyond storage pool</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>libvirt</name>
+ <range><ge>1.1.0</ge><lt>1.2.19_2</lt></range>
+ <range><ge>1.2.20</ge><lt>1.3.0</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>Libvit development team reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="http://security.libvirt.org/2015/0004.html">
+ <p>Various virStorageVol* API operate on user-supplied volume names by
+ concatenating the volume name to the pool location. Note that the
+ virStoragePoolListVolumes API, when used on a storage pool backed by
+ a directory in a file system, will only list volumes immediately in
+ that directory (there is no traversal into subdirectories). However,
+ other APIs such as virStorageVolCreateXML were not checking if a
+ potential volume name represented one of the volumes that could be
+ returned by virStoragePoolListVolumes; because they were not rejecting
+ the use of '/' in a volume name.</p>
+ <p>Because no checking was done on volume names, a user could supply
+ a potential volume name of something like '../../../etc/passwd' to
+ attempt to access a file not belonging to the storage pool. When
+ fine-grained Access Control Lists (ACL) are in effect, a user with
+ storage_vol:create ACL permission but lacking domain:write permssion
+ could thus abuse virStorageVolCreateXML and similar APIs to gain
+ access to files not normally permitted to that user. Fortunately, it
+ appears that the only APIs that could leak information or corrupt
+ files require read-write connection to libvirtd; and when ACLs are not
+ in use (the default without any further configuration), a user with
+ read-write access can already be considered to have full access to the
+ machine, and without an escalation of privilege there is no security
+ problem.</p>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <cvename>CVE-2015-5313</cvename>
+ <url>http://security.libvirt.org/2015/0004.html</url>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2015-10-30</discovery>
+ <entry>2015-12-20</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
<vuln vid="ef434839-a6a4-11e5-8275-000c292e4fd8">
<topic>samba -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
<affects>
More information about the svn-ports-all
mailing list