MAC implementation with definable policy

[Ilmar S. Habibulin]

On Wed, 29 Sep 1999, James Buster wrote:

> } The main feature of MAC is control of information flows, to prevent
> } unauthorized information declassification(lowering the label). imho.
> But the definition of how information flows is fixed by the
> implementation. The MAC implementation I posted allows you
> to define nearly any information flow you want.
Ok. I'm reading file with labelA, then i'm reading file with labelB, which
dominates labelA. After reading i'm cleating new file. What label should
it have?

If it will be labelB in your implementation, then it defines a set of MAC
labels and their access type to object labeled by labelB. The label is
some sort of ACL. i'm cofused...

But BL MAC implementation is much more simplier. And i do not understand,
why can't i emulate your approach using BL MAC and ACL?

> } FLAME!!! ;-) test core dumps after "policy size == 520", C compiler says
> } "invalid option: `-fullwarn'".
> Remove -fullwarn from the Makefile. As for the core dump, you must
I do so. That's why i've got the binaries and coredump. ;-)

> specify two label names after the command, like so:
> 
> ./test -d dblow userlow
There was no such instructions or i just didn't see them.

> } It's not MAC as i understand it, it does not reflect all aspects of
> } confidential data processing.
> MAC in general does not "reflect all aspects of confidential data processing".
But Bell and LaPadula thought so, while creating their model.

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