PERFORCE change 187358 for review

[Edward Tomasz Napierala]

http://p4web.freebsd.org/@@187358?ac=10

Change 187358 by trasz at trasz_victim on 2010/12/31 20:01:46

	Fixes for hierarchical jails.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/TODO#38 edit
.. //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/sys/kern/kern_container.c#47 edit
.. //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/sys/kern/kern_hrl.c#103 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/TODO#38 (text+ko) ====

@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@
 
  - Fix %CPU limits for shortly living processes.
 
- - Make sure we enforce limits whenever it's needed.
-
- - Add support for hierarchical jails.
-
  - Get rid of container_lock.  Atomic instructions would be nice, but we really
    need 64 bits (per-process counters could be 32 bit, I guess, but the higher
    level containers could overflow), and atomic(9) doesn't support 64 bit values
@@ -45,6 +41,10 @@
 
 Issues:
 
+ - We enforce limits when a process allocates a resource, and when it forks.
+   We don't enforce limits when process changes its credentials, though.  This
+   might be either a bug or feature, depending on point of view.
+
  - In the long term, the goal is to get rid of lim_get(9), chgproccnt(9) etc,
    turning this:
 

==== //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/sys/kern/kern_container.c#47 (text+ko) ====

@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@
 void
 rusage_add_cred(struct ucred *cred, int resource, uint64_t amount)
 {
+	struct prison *pr;
 
 	SDT_PROBE(container, kernel, rusage, add_cred, cred, resource, amount, 0, 0);
 
@@ -315,7 +316,8 @@
 
 	mtx_lock(&container_lock);
 	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_ruidinfo->ui_container, resource, amount);
-	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_prison->pr_container, resource, amount);
+	for (pr = cred->cr_prison; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent)
+		container_alloc_resource(&pr->pr_container, resource, amount);
 	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_loginclass->lc_container, resource, amount);
 	mtx_unlock(&container_lock);
 }
@@ -476,6 +478,7 @@
 void
 rusage_sub_cred(struct ucred *cred, int resource, uint64_t amount)
 {
+	struct prison *pr;
 
 	SDT_PROBE(container, kernel, rusage, sub_cred, cred, resource, amount, 0, 0);
 
@@ -488,7 +491,8 @@
 
 	mtx_lock(&container_lock);
 	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_ruidinfo->ui_container, resource, -amount);
-	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_prison->pr_container, resource, -amount);
+	for (pr = cred->cr_prison; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent)
+		container_alloc_resource(&pr->pr_container, resource, -amount);
 	container_alloc_resource(&cred->cr_loginclass->lc_container, resource, -amount);
 	mtx_unlock(&container_lock);
 }
@@ -590,7 +594,7 @@
 {
 	struct uidinfo *olduip, *newuip;
 	struct loginclass *oldlc, *newlc;
-	struct prison *oldpr, *newpr;
+	struct prison *oldpr, *newpr, *pr;
 
 	PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
 
@@ -611,8 +615,10 @@
 		container_add(&newlc->lc_container, &p->p_container);
 	}
 	if (newpr != oldpr) {
-		container_sub(&oldpr->pr_container, &p->p_container);
-		container_add(&newpr->pr_container, &p->p_container);
+		for (pr = oldpr; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent)
+			container_sub(&pr->pr_container, &p->p_container);
+		for (pr = newpr; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent)
+			container_add(&pr->pr_container, &p->p_container);
 	}
 	mtx_unlock(&container_lock);
 

==== //depot/projects/soc2009/trasz_limits/sys/kern/kern_hrl.c#103 (text+ko) ====

@@ -834,6 +834,7 @@
 	struct uidinfo *uip;
 	struct prison *pr;
 	struct loginclass *lc;
+	int match;
 
 	KASSERT(hrl_rule_fully_specified(rule), ("rule not fully specified"));
 
@@ -899,9 +900,15 @@
 				break;
 			continue;
 		case HRL_SUBJECT_TYPE_JAIL:
-			for (pr = cred->cr_prison; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent)
-				if (pr->pr_id == rule->hr_subject.hs_prison->pr_id)
+			match = 0;
+			for (pr = cred->cr_prison; pr != NULL; pr = pr->pr_parent) {
+				if (pr == rule->hr_subject.hs_prison) {
+					match = 1;
 					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (match)
+				break;
 			continue;
 		default:
 			panic("hrl_rule_add: unknown subject type %d",