From oliver.pntr at gmail.com Thu Jun 4 20:15:36 2009 From: oliver.pntr at gmail.com (Oliver Pinter) Date: Thu Jun 4 20:15:42 2009 Subject: OpenSSL DoS/PoC in milw0rm Message-ID: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> the base system contins 0.9.8e and this PoC is affected up to 0.9.8i not yet tested the question is, the freebsd is affected for this error/malware/poc? http://milw0rm.com/exploits/8873 From pieter at thedarkside.nl Thu Jun 4 21:47:00 2009 From: pieter at thedarkside.nl (Pieter de Boer) Date: Thu Jun 4 21:47:07 2009 Subject: OpenSSL DoS/PoC in milw0rm In-Reply-To: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> References: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4A2840CF.6020209@thedarkside.nl> Oliver Pinter wrote: > the base system contins 0.9.8e and this PoC is affected up to 0.9.8i > not yet tested > the question is, the freebsd is affected for this error/malware/poc? > http://milw0rm.com/exploits/8873 (term1) OpenSSL> version OpenSSL 0.9.8e 23 Feb 2007 % openssl s_server -cert /usr/src/crypto/openssl/apps/server.pem -accept 1234 -dtls1 ... (term2) % ./cve-2009-1386 localhost 1234 [+] Sending DTLS datagram of death at localhost:1234... ... (term1) zsh: segmentation fault (core dumped) openssl s_server -cert /usr/src/crypto/openssl/apps/server.pem -accept 1234 GDB shows: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x480fe28d in ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec () from /usr/lib/libssl.so.5 ... 0x480fe28d : mov %eax,0xac(%edx) ... (gdb) i r edx edx 0x0 0 Looks vulnerable, but I had to force DTLS using the -dtls1 switch, so it may not be much of an issue in most real world configurations? -- Pieter From rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru Fri Jun 5 06:37:16 2009 From: rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru (Eygene Ryabinkin) Date: Fri Jun 5 06:37:24 2009 Subject: OpenSSL DoS/PoC in milw0rm In-Reply-To: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> References: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Thu, Jun 04, 2009 at 10:15:34PM +0200, Oliver Pinter wrote: > the base system contins 0.9.8e and this PoC is affected up to 0.9.8i There was combined PR for the ports/base system OpenSSL, http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=134653 Probably more complete patch for DTLS stuff, http://sctp.fh-muenster.de/dtls/dtls-bugs.patch that additionally fixes MTU problems and other stuff can be integrated to the base system as it was recently done with the security/openssl. I am in ENOTIME now, so I'm not able to test these patches myself, sorry. -- Eygene _ ___ _.--. # \`.|\..----...-'` `-._.-'_.-'` # Remember that it is hard / ' ` , __.--' # to read the on-line manual )/' _/ \ `-_, / # while single-stepping the kernel. `-'" `"\_ ,_.-;_.-\_ ', fsc/as # _.-'_./ {_.' ; / # -- FreeBSD Developers handbook {_.-``-' {_/ # From oliver.pntr at gmail.com Fri Jun 5 09:51:29 2009 From: oliver.pntr at gmail.com (Oliver Pinter) Date: Fri Jun 5 09:51:35 2009 Subject: OpenSSL DoS/PoC in milw0rm In-Reply-To: References: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6101e8c40906050251l6d744649ja6a051a807c860b8@mail.gmail.com> thanks for the fast reply, and the patch On 6/5/09, Eygene Ryabinkin wrote: > Thu, Jun 04, 2009 at 10:15:34PM +0200, Oliver Pinter wrote: >> the base system contins 0.9.8e and this PoC is affected up to 0.9.8i > > There was combined PR for the ports/base system OpenSSL, > http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=134653 > > Probably more complete patch for DTLS stuff, > http://sctp.fh-muenster.de/dtls/dtls-bugs.patch > that additionally fixes MTU problems and other stuff can be integrated > to the base system as it was recently done with the security/openssl. > I am in ENOTIME now, so I'm not able to test these patches myself, sorry. > -- > Eygene > _ ___ _.--. # > \`.|\..----...-'` `-._.-'_.-'` # Remember that it is hard > / ' ` , __.--' # to read the on-line manual > )/' _/ \ `-_, / # while single-stepping the kernel. > `-'" `"\_ ,_.-;_.-\_ ', fsc/as # > _.-'_./ {_.' ; / # -- FreeBSD Developers handbook > {_.-``-' {_/ # > From rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru Fri Jun 5 10:06:39 2009 From: rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru (Eygene Ryabinkin) Date: Fri Jun 5 10:06:47 2009 Subject: OpenSSL DoS/PoC in milw0rm In-Reply-To: <6101e8c40906050251l6d744649ja6a051a807c860b8@mail.gmail.com> References: <6101e8c40906041315t5b9c2b6ep4f35b2068586f2c3@mail.gmail.com> <6101e8c40906050251l6d744649ja6a051a807c860b8@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Oliver, good day. Fri, Jun 05, 2009 at 11:51:27AM +0200, Oliver Pinter wrote: > thanks for the fast reply, and the patch No problems. If you'll be messing with either of patches, please, report on your findings. Thanks! -- Eygene _ ___ _.--. # \`.|\..----...-'` `-._.-'_.-'` # Remember that it is hard / ' ` , __.--' # to read the on-line manual )/' _/ \ `-_, / # while single-stepping the kernel. `-'" `"\_ ,_.-;_.-\_ ', fsc/as # _.-'_./ {_.' ; / # -- FreeBSD Developers handbook {_.-``-' {_/ # From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:46 2009 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed Jun 10 10:42:01 2009 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAfj8S025321@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: ntpd stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability Category: contrib Module: ntpd Announced: 2009-06-10 Credits: Chris Ries Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11) CVE Name: CVE-2009-1252 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time source. Autokey is a security model for authenticating Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers to clients, using public key cryptography. II. Problem Description The ntpd(8) daemon is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow when it is configured to use the 'autokey' security model. III. Impact This issue could be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the context of the service daemon, or crash the service daemon, causing denial-of-service conditions. IV. Workaround Use IP based restrictions in ntpd(8) itself or in IP firewalls to restrict which systems can send NTP packets to ntpd(8). Note that systems will only be affected if they have the "autokey" option set in /etc/ntp.conf; FreeBSD does not ship with a default ntp.conf file, so will not be affected unless this option has been explicitly enabled by the system administrator. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4, 7.1, and 7.2 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 6.3] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd63.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd63.patch.asc [FreeBSD 6.4 and 7.x] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/ntp/ntpd # make obj && make depend && make && make install # /etc/rc.d/ntpd restart VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_6 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.8.3 RELENG_6_4 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.8.1.2.2 RELENG_6_3 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.20.2 RELENG_7 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.3 RELENG_7_2 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.2.2.1 RELENG_7_1 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10 src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.1.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/6/ r193893 releng/6.4/ r193893 releng/6.3/ r193893 stable/7/ r193893 releng/7.2/ r193893 releng/7.1/ r193893 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1252 The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAkovjOwACgkQFdaIBMps37KRpwCfaQF9q8KhElv6LqgFv3DX2h9c hbEAn2Q0X8Qv8r5OySnhlAw2pMxlxkXK =Mh2u -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:50 2009 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed Jun 10 10:42:21 2009 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6 Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAfnfp025363@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6 Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Missing permission check on SIOCSIFINFO_IN6 ioctl Category: core Module: netinet6 Announced: 2009-06-10 Credits: Hiroki Sato Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background IPv6 is a new Internet Protocol, designed to replace (and avoid many of the problems with) the current Internet Protocol (version 4). Many properties of the FreeBSD IPv6 network stack can be configured via the ioctl(2) interface. II. Problem Description The SIOCSIFINFO_IN6 ioctl is missing a necessary permissions check. III. Impact Local users, including non-root users and users inside jails, can set some IPv6 interface properties. These include changing the link MTU and disabling interfaces entirely. Note that this affects IPv6 only; IPv4 functionality cannot be affected by exploiting this vulnerability. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without local untrusted users are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4, 7.1, and 7.2 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 6.x] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6-6.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6-6.patch.asc [FreeBSD 7.x] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_6 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.13 RELENG_6_4 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.12.2.2 RELENG_6_3 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.11.2.1 RELENG_7 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.7 RELENG_7_2 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.6.2.2 RELENG_7_1 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10 src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.4.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/6/ r193893 releng/6.4/ r193893 releng/6.3/ r193893 stable/7/ r193893 releng/7.2/ r193893 releng/7.1/ r193893 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAkovjOUACgkQFdaIBMps37IFxwCgj0o1r4IQMIEvp3y4oIqhQwxe cI8AoIlxweqjakKxu/A/Z4+xjoGmqUdF =/kNi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:56 2009 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed Jun 10 10:42:39 2009 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAft1r025416@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Local information disclosure via direct pipe writes Category: core Module: kern Announced: 2009-06-10 Credits: Pieter de Boer Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5) 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background One of the most commonly used forms of interprocess communication on FreeBSD and other UNIX-like systems is the (anonymous) pipe. In this mechanism, a pair of file descriptors is created, and data written to one descriptor can be read from the other. FreeBSD's pipe implementation contains an optimization known as "direct writes". In this optimization, rather than copying data into kernel memory when the write(2) system call is invoked and then copying the data again when the read(2) system call is invoked, the FreeBSD kernel takes advantage of virtual memory mapping to allow the data to be copied directly between processes. II. Problem Description An integer overflow in computing the set of pages containing data to be copied can result in virtual-to-physical address lookups not being performed. III. Impact An unprivileged process can read pages of memory which belong to other processes or to the kernel. These may contain information which is sensitive in itself; or may contain passwords or cryptographic keys which can be indirectly exploited to gain sensitive information or access. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users are not vulnerable. System administrators are reminded that even if a system is not intended to have untrusted local users, it may be possible for an attacker to exploit some other vulnerability to obtain local user access to a system. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4, 7.1, and 7.2 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:09/pipe.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:09/pipe.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_6 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.5 RELENG_6_4 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.4.2.2 RELENG_6_3 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.2.6.2 RELENG_7 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.5 RELENG_7_2 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.3.4.2 RELENG_7_1 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10 src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.3.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/6/ r193893 releng/6.4/ r193893 releng/6.3/ r193893 stable/7/ r193893 releng/7.2/ r193893 releng/7.1/ r193893 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAkovjN0ACgkQFdaIBMps37JkXwCgmLcEMOMAEIXRoJ220zwZhMKn f+gAn1bZyLMhfZU7TI0xxhizwetDwMVI =J37B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From bra at fsn.hu Mon Jun 22 10:27:31 2009 From: bra at fsn.hu (Attila Nagy) Date: Mon Jun 22 10:27:39 2009 Subject: Auditing daemons with BSM Message-ID: <4A3F5820.9050602@fsn.hu> Hello, I would like to audit(4) local daemons, started with rc.d scripts during the bootup sequence. I've set up audit_user and _control and when I log in with the username, it works just fine, but for the already started programs, audit doesn't produce anything. What's the preferred (I hope it's possible without any hacks) way of doing this? Thanks,