From cperciva at freebsd.org Wed Apr 1 00:17:38 2009 From: cperciva at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Officer) Date: Wed Apr 1 00:17:45 2009 Subject: HEADS UP: FreeBSD 7.0 EoL coming soon Message-ID: <49D31510.7050908@freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello Everyone, On April 30th, FreeBSD 7.0 will reach its End of Life and will no longer be supported by the FreeBSD Security Team. Users of FreeBSD 7.0 are strongly encouraged to upgrade to FreeBSD 7.1 before that date. Note that the End of Life date for FreeBSD 7.0 was originally announced as being February 28, but was delayed by two months in accordance with Security Team policy in order to allow a 3 month window between the release of FreeBSD 7.1 and the End of Life of FreeBSD 7.0 to allow time for systems to be upgraded. The current supported branches and expected EoL dates are: ~ +---------------------------------------------------------------------+ ~ | Branch | Release | Type | Release date | Estimated EoL | ~ |-----------+------------+--------+-----------------+-----------------| ~ |RELENG_6 |n/a |n/a |n/a |November 30, 2010| ~ |-----------+------------+--------+-----------------+-----------------| ~ |RELENG_6_3 |6.3-RELEASE |Extended|January 18, 2008 |January 31, 2010 | ~ |---------------------------------------------------------------------| ~ |RELENG_6_4 |6.4-RELEASE |Extended|November 18, 2008|November 30, 2010| ~ |---------------------------------------------------------------------| ~ |RELENG_7 |n/a |n/a |n/a |last release + 2y| ~ |-----------+------------+--------+-----------------+-----------------| ~ |RELENG_7_0 |7.0-RELEASE |Normal |February 27, 2008|April 30, 2009 | ~ |-----------+------------+--------+-----------------+-----------------| ~ |RELENG_7_1 |7.1-RELEASE |Extended|January 4, 2009 |January 31, 2011 | ~ +---------------------------------------------------------------------+ When FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE is released, it will receive "Normal" support, i.e., it will be supported for at least 12 months. - -- Colin Percival Security Officer, FreeBSD | freebsd.org | The power to serve Founder / author, Tarsnap | tarsnap.com | Online backups for the truly paranoid -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAknTFQ8ACgkQFdaIBMps37ILwACggF8T2Yb4SSMqzviMDcHB74w4 5oQAoJ7oToAdSFT8eJlAWwWwldz8M4I2 =Er3j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mike at sentex.net Mon Apr 6 11:58:11 2009 From: mike at sentex.net (Mike Tancsa) Date: Mon Apr 6 11:59:01 2009 Subject: Openssl advisory ? Message-ID: <200904061843.n36IhGxl052471@lava.sentex.ca> Just wondering if this impacts FreeBSD's version in any significant way ? http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090325.txt ---Mike -------------------------------------------------------------------- Mike Tancsa, tel +1 519 651 3400 Sentex Communications, mike@sentex.net Providing Internet since 1994 www.sentex.net Cambridge, Ontario Canada www.sentex.net/mike From mark at foster.cc Mon Apr 6 13:54:27 2009 From: mark at foster.cc (Mark Foster) Date: Mon Apr 6 13:54:35 2009 Subject: Openssl advisory ? In-Reply-To: <200904061843.n36IhGxl052471@lava.sentex.ca> References: <200904061843.n36IhGxl052471@lava.sentex.ca> Message-ID: <49DA68DC.1040608@foster.cc> Mike Tancsa wrote: > > Just wondering if this impacts FreeBSD's version in any significant way ? > > http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090325.txt > > ---Mike > Looks like ports/133156 is being kept open for the base issue. http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=ports/133156 It should probably be re-assigned to secteam@ -- I hate rascists. Mark D. Foster http://mark.foster.cc/ | http://conshell.net/ From rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru Thu Apr 9 15:02:09 2009 From: rea-fbsd at codelabs.ru (Eygene Ryabinkin) Date: Thu Apr 9 15:02:36 2009 Subject: Openssl advisory ? In-Reply-To: <200904061843.n36IhGxl052471@lava.sentex.ca> References: <200904061843.n36IhGxl052471@lava.sentex.ca> Message-ID: <9JcZBMdMQ7dwCWEdjJLVlfrtgTg@7qgLKkvX/1U6eu9avhKQpU/1pEI> Mike, *, good day. Mon, Apr 06, 2009 at 02:44:01PM -0400, Mike Tancsa wrote: > Just wondering if this impacts FreeBSD's version in any significant way ? > > http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090325.txt DoS is probably the likiest item that will be visible: CMS is disabled by-default in upstream version and isn't yet present in FreeBSD's OpenSSL (checked 7-STABLE and 8-CURRENT) and the third issue is only present on platforms where sizeof (void *) > sizeof (long). I guess that there could be such platforms (and compilers) on FreeBSD that will produce such result, but I can't name anything. I only know that M$'s Visual Studio will produce sizeof(long) == 4 and sizeof(void *) == 8 on the 64-bit branch. By the way, there is other. older OpenSSL issue that looks unpatched, http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=bin/126446 Side-channel attacks are often hard to conduct and some special curcumstances should hold, but when it is done properly, this could yield very sound results, for example, http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt Perhaps the second issue could be patched as well? The patch touches only Montgomery multiplication routine and should not interfere with anything else, so it should be rather safe to fix this vulnerability in terms of possible regressions. -- Eygene _ ___ _.--. # \`.|\..----...-'` `-._.-'_.-'` # Remember that it is hard / ' ` , __.--' # to read the on-line manual )/' _/ \ `-_, / # while single-stepping the kernel. `-'" `"\_ ,_.-;_.-\_ ', fsc/as # _.-'_./ {_.' ; / # -- FreeBSD Developers handbook {_.-``-' {_/ # From stas at deglitch.com Mon Apr 20 16:35:58 2009 From: stas at deglitch.com (Stanislav Sedov) Date: Mon Apr 20 18:30:42 2009 Subject: ipv6 and ipfw In-Reply-To: <147404.54014.qm@web52106.mail.re2.yahoo.com> References: <200902100012.n1A0CHLr027615@drugs.dv.isc.org> <147404.54014.qm@web52106.mail.re2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20090420203554.96141565.stas@deglitch.com> On Mon, 9 Feb 2009 17:29:11 -0800 (PST) gahn wrote: > > Thanks Mark: > > my machine would load the modules when the system boots up. here is my rc.conf: > > firewall_enable="YES" > firewall_script="/etc/ipfw.conf" > firewall_logging="YES" > > does that matter? Your system's ipfw definitely supports ipv6. You can use the same firewall script to set up ipv6 rules as well. Note, however, that there's a different set of sysctl exists to control ip6fw, namely net.inet6.ip6.fw. Thus to enable it at the boot time you certainly need to add ipv6_firewall_enable="YES" into your rc.conf. There're also a bunch of other IPv6 related configurational options exist: ipv6_firewall_enable="NO" # Set to YES to enable IPv6 firewall # functionality ipv6_firewall_script="/etc/rc.firewall6" # Which script to run to set up the IPv6 firewall ipv6_firewall_type="UNKNOWN" # IPv6 Firewall type (see /etc/rc.firewall6) ipv6_firewall_quiet="NO" # Set to YES to suppress rule display ipv6_firewall_logging="NO" # Set to YES to enable events logging -- Stanislav Sedov ST4096-RIPE !DSPAM:49eca46b967004490364599! From stas at deglitch.com Mon Apr 20 16:37:50 2009 From: stas at deglitch.com (Stanislav Sedov) Date: Mon Apr 20 18:31:11 2009 Subject: OpenSolaris Cryptographic Framework In-Reply-To: <49A2B244.3000307@bulinfo.net> References: <49A2B244.3000307@bulinfo.net> Message-ID: <20090420203747.72055582.stas@deglitch.com> On Mon, 23 Feb 2009 16:27:16 +0200 Krassimir Slavchev wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hello All, > > Is there any plans to import the Cryptographic Framework from > OpenSolaris to FreeBSD? > > Reference: > http://opensolaris.org/os/project/crypto/ > I beleive none is working on this now. Does it have any benefits over the crypto framework we're using now? -- Stanislav Sedov ST4096-RIPE !DSPAM:49eca4dc967003632114287! From stas at deglitch.com Mon Apr 20 16:49:38 2009 From: stas at deglitch.com (Stanislav Sedov) Date: Mon Apr 20 19:36:28 2009 Subject: emacs installs a lot of 777 directories In-Reply-To: <87eiwtwvwb.fsf@kobe.laptop> References: <200903062256.n26MuA2r085728@pc.jgr.de> <87ljr61t3v.fsf@kobe.laptop> <20090319102606.GA27912@ace.cs.uoi.gr> <87eiwtwvwb.fsf@kobe.laptop> Message-ID: <20090420204932.c6fe17c6.stas@deglitch.com> On Thu, 19 Mar 2009 14:16:04 +0200 Giorgos Keramidas wrote: > On Thu, 19 Mar 2009 12:26:06 +0200, Nikos Ntarmos wrote: > >On Sun, Mar 15, 2009 at 09:30:44PM +0200, Giorgos Keramidas wrote: > >>On Fri, 6 Mar 2009 23:56:10 +0100 (CET), freebsd001@pc.jgr.de wrote: > >>> Dear list members, > >>> > >>> I am not only wondering about the permissions of several emacs-related > >>> directories as it has recently been mentioned in this thread, but also > >>> about the ownership of several emacs-related files. > >> > >> This seems to be a local installation glitch. > >> > >>>>find . -not -user root | head -n 3 > >>> ./emacs/22.3/etc > >>> ./emacs/22.3/etc/GNUS-NEWS > >>> ./emacs/22.3/etc/fr-drdref.ps > >>> > >>>>find . -not -user root | wc -l > >>> 2643 > > > > That's probably due to the fact that emacs uses something along the > > lines of 'tar -chf - ... | tar -xvf - ...' to copy the files, followed > > (in some cases) by a chown to $LOGNAME (or if that is not set, to > > $USERNAME). If you just 'su', LOGNAME remains set to what it was > > before (i.e. nutzer), while 'su -' will clear that out. > > Yep, that's exactly what the Emacs build glue does. > > One of the directories mentioned in the permission listings of the > thread includes `leim/'. The source of `emacs/leim/Makefile.in' > installs files with tar and chown: > > 240 tar -chf - quail/* ja-dic \ > 241 | (cd ${INSTALLDIR}; umask 0; tar -xvf - && cat > /dev/null) ;\ > ... > 264 find ${INSTALLDIR} -exec chown $${installuser} '{}' ';' > I don't think it's a right thing to do, as it doesn't obey nor SHAREOWN/ SHAREGROUP not SHAREMODE, which all ports are supposed to follow. Exactly for these reason we have special macros COPYTREE_* in bsd.port.mk. Any chance emacs port could be tricked to use these macros instead of a hand- crafted untar command? -- Stanislav Sedov ST4096-RIPE !DSPAM:49eca7a0967001169884880! From ltning at anduin.net Mon Apr 20 20:17:15 2009 From: ltning at anduin.net (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Eirik_=D8verby?=) Date: Mon Apr 20 20:17:22 2009 Subject: Audit(d) and jails Message-ID: <4BD35D05-473B-46EB-A96F-EA18234FED9D@anduin.net> Hi all, I've been struggling lately to find a way to use the audit functionality in any meaningful way while using jails. My original idea was running auditd on the host, and thus get audit data for all the jails - however this proves impractical as identifying, for instance, the path of an executable inside a jail is impossible (it shows as //usr/bin/something in the logs). I have also failed to run auditd inside the jails, and doing so would somehow reduce its value - as the idea is to lock down the host and audit from there. I see there is a SOC project to make audit jail-aware, but I'm sure I've missed something in the current implementation (7.1) as well. Could anyone share their experiences on this with me - or am I on the wrong track entirely? Thanks, /Eirik From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 22 14:19:09 2009 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed Apr 22 14:19:22 2009 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:08.openssl Message-ID: <200904221419.n3MEJ8bJ073370@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-09:08.openssl Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Remotely exploitable crash in OpenSSL Category: contrib Module: openssl Announced: 2009-04-22 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-PRERELEASE) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RC2) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p5) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7_0, 7.0-RELEASE-p12) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p4) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p10) CVE Name: CVE-2009-0590 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The function ASN1_STRING_print_ex is often used to print the contents of an SSL certificate. II. Problem Description The function ASN1_STRING_print_ex does not properly validate the lengths of BMPString or UniversalString objects before attempting to print them. III. Impact An application which attempts to print a BMPString or UniversalString which has an invalid length will crash as a result of OpenSSL accessing invalid memory locations. This could be used by an attacker to crash a remote application. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but applications which do not use the ASN1_STRING_print_ex function (either directly or indirectly) are not affected. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_7_0, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, and 7.2 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 7.x] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:08/openssl.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:08/openssl.patch.asc [FreeBSD 6.x] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:08/openssl6.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:08/openssl6.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/secure/lib/libcrypto # make obj && make depend && make includes && make && make install NOTE: On the amd64 platform, the above procedure will not update the lib32 (i386 compatibility) libraries. On amd64 systems where the i386 compatibility libraries are used, the operating system should instead be recompiled as described in VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_6 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.4.12.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.2.10.2 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.1.1.7.10.1 RELENG_6_4 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.10 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.4.24.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.2.10.1.6.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.1.1.7.22.1 RELENG_6_3 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.15 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.14 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.4.22.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.2.10.1.4.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.1.1.7.20.1 RELENG_7 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.6.2.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.5.2.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.2.2.1 RELENG_7_2 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.2 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.6.8.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.5.8.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.2.8.1 RELENG_7_1 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.9 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.6.6.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.5.6.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.2.6.1 RELENG_7_0 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.3.2.16 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.5.2.16 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 1.1.1.6.4.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 1.1.1.5.4.1 src/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h 1.2.4.1 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/6/ r191381 releng/6.4/ r191381 releng/6.3/ r191381 stable/7/ r191381 releng/7.2/ r191381 releng/7.1/ r191381 releng/7.0/ r191381 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References http://openssl.org/news/secadv_20090325.txt [Note that two of the issues mentioned in the OpenSSL advisory do not affect FreeBSD.] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0590 The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:08.openssl.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAknvJegACgkQFdaIBMps37LB4gCffpTTOSdqyLK6ravrv6h8LqWE MDcAn2SIjNmRL8Oktk0l9hLz0mhtcxWP =Q7Zz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 22 14:19:13 2009 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed Apr 22 14:19:42 2009 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:07.libc Message-ID: <200904221419.n3MEJCiD073412@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-09:07.libc Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Information leak in db(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced: 2009-04-22 Credits: Jaakko Heinonen, Xin LI Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2009-04-11 15:19:26 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-PRERELEASE) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p5) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_7_0, 7.0-RELEASE-p12) 2009-04-11 15:21:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p4) 2009-04-22 14:07:14 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p10) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background FreeBSD's C library (libc) contains code for creating and accessing Berkeley DB 1.85 database files. Such databases are used extensively in FreeBSD; for example, the system password files (/etc/passwd and /etc/master.passwd) are normally accessed via their database files (/etc/pwd.db and /etc/spwd.db). II. Problem Description Some data structures used by the database interface code are not properly initialized when allocated. III. Impact Programs using the db(3) interface to create Berkeley database files may "leak" sensitive information into database files. If those files can be read by other users, this may result in the disclosure of sensitive information such as login credentials. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users are probably not affected (since remote attackers will in most cases not be able to read such database files). V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_1, RELENG_7_0, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, and 7.1 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:07/libc.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:07/libc.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/lib/libc # make obj && make depend && make && make install NOTE: On the amd64 platform, the above procedure will not update the lib32 (i386 compatibility) libraries. On amd64 systems where the i386 compatibility libraries are used, the operating system should instead be recompiled as described in NOTE: System administrators may wish to rebuild any system database files which were created prior to applying this patch in case they contain sensitive information. VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_6 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.7.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_open.c 1.11.14.1 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.7.14.1 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.12.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/README 1.1.40.1 RELENG_6_4 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.10 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.7.12.2 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.7.26.2 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.12.12.2 RELENG_6_3 src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.15 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.14 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.7.10.1 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.7.24.1 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.12.10.1 RELENG_7 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.8.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_open.c 1.12.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.8.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.13.2.1 src/lib/libc/db/README 1.1.50.1 RELENG_7_1 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.9 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.8.6.2 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.8.6.2 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.13.6.2 RELENG_7_0 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.3.2.16 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.5.2.16 src/lib/libc/db/btree/bt_split.c 1.8.4.1 src/lib/libc/db/hash/hash_buf.c 1.8.4.1 src/lib/libc/db/mpool/mpool.c 1.13.4.1 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/6/ r190940 releng/6.4/ r191381 releng/6.3/ r191381 stable/7/ r190939 releng/7.1/ r191381 releng/7.0/ r191381 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:07.libc.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAknvJlkACgkQFdaIBMps37JcyACggmDk96JTy3G5gGlzMlNuVsV7 s5wAoIT2G2c3T6bYa7GeftWLpGGFo2Rp =rdqD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----