BIND update?

[Chris Palmer]

Jason Stone wrote:

> So you say, "But I don't send important information over that 
> connection, nor do I trust the information I get back?"  Maybe.  I think 
> that the AOL data leak fiasco proved that, while people don't generally 
> think of search queries as sensitive, they really kind of are.  And you 
> almost certainly place _some_ trust in the results you get back; I mean, 
> you're not reading them purely as fiction.

I validate such unauthenticated information at the human layer. Have to -- 
even when nobody has tampered with DNS, BGP, or HTTP, the stuff at 
nytimes.com and wikipedia.org is still often false.

> So, if your DNS resolver is vulnerable to cache poisoning, then every 
> time you casually surf the web, you're allowing for the possibility that 
> you will get spoofed, surf to some malware site, get served a browser 
> exploit, and get 0wned.

That is already true, and is true regardless of the "security" of the DNS.

Think hard on why this is possible:

http://ex-parrot.com/~pete/upside-down-ternet.html

:)

Similarly, why does YouTube disappear whenever Pervez Musharraf gets cranky?

> I agree that DNSSEC is the real solution.

It won't, and can't, solve *any* of the problems you cited. Any attacker 
than can mangle my DNS traffic (and cache poisoning is hardly the only way 
to do that) can also just read and alter *any* non-secure-by-design 
plaintext network traffic.

> I also think that making it easy (or even possible) to sandbox the
> browsers is a real solution. I think that using strong crypto everywhere
> and making fine-grained capabilities and MAC systems ubiquitous is also a
> real solution.

Okay, I know when I'm being trolled. :) I'll stop posting now. It's bed time 
anyway.