FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc

[Mark Andrews]

> At 06:09 PM 1/14/2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >Hash: SHA1
> >
> >============================================================================
> =
> >FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc                                       Security Advisor
> y
> >                                                           The FreeBSD Proje
> ct
> >
> >Topic:          inet_network() buffer overflow
> >
> >For programs which passes untrusted data to inet_network(), an
> >attacker may be able to overwrite a region of memory with user defined
> >data by causing specially crafted input to be passed to
> >inet_network().
> 
> For the "usual suspects" of applications running, (e.g. sendmail, 
> apache, BIND etc) would it be possible to pass crafted packets 
> through to this function remotely via those apps ?  ie how easy is this to do
>  ?

	The usual suspects don't call inet_network().
	route calls inet_network() but not routed doesn't.

	Mark

% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/usr.sbin/sendmail/sendmail | grep inet
         U __inet_addr
         U __inet_ntoa
         U __inet_ntop
         U __inet_pton
% 

% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/usr.sbin/named/named | grep inet
         U __inet_aton
         U __inet_ntop
         U __inet_pton
0817f084 d cfg_type_inetcontrol
0814ee20 t inet_ntop4
0814f0f8 t inet_pton4
080fb668 t inet_totext
0817f0a0 d inetcontrol_fields
% 
	
% nm /usr/obj/usr/src/sbin/route/route | grep inet
         U __inet_aton
         U __inet_lnaof
         U __inet_network
         U __inet_ntoa
08049a94 T inet_makenetandmask
% 

>          ---Mike 
> 
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews at isc.org