From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jan 14 21:44:20 2015 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 21:44:19 GMT Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:01.openssl Message-ID: <201501142144.t0ELiJL9002083@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:01.openssl Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities Category: contrib Module: openssl Announced: 2015-01-14 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-01-09 00:58:20 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-STABLE) 2015-01-14 21:27:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p4) 2015-01-14 21:27:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p16) 2015-01-09 01:11:43 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-01-14 21:27:46 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p8) 2015-01-09 01:11:43 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-01-14 21:27:46 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p22) CVE Name: CVE-2014-3571, CVE-2015-0206, CVE-2014-3569, CVE-2014-3572 CVE-2015-0204, CVE-2015-0205, CVE-2014-8275, CVE-2014-3570 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. II. Problem Description A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. [CVE-2014-3571] A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. [CVE-2015-0206] When OpenSSL is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. [CVE-2014-3569] This does not affect FreeBSD's default build. An OpenSSL client will accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuite using an ECDSA certificate if the server key exchange message is omitted. [CVE-2014-3572] An OpenSSL client will accept the use of an RSA temporary key in a non-export RSA key exchange ciphersuite. [CVE-2015-0204] An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. [CVE-2015-0205] OpenSSL accepts several non-DER-variations of certificate signature algorithm and signature encodings. OpenSSL also does not enforce a match between the signature algorithm between the signed and unsigned portions of the certificate. [CVE-2014-8275] Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. [CVE-2014-3570] III. Impact An attacker who can send a carefully crafted DTLS message can cause server daemons that uses OpenSSL to crash, resulting a Denial of Service. [CVE-2014-3571] An attacker who can send repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch can exhaust the server's memory and result in a Denial of Service. [CVE-2015-0206] A server can remove forward secrecy from the ciphersuite. [CVE-2014-3572] A server could present a weak temporary key and downgrade the security of the session. [CVE-2015-0204] A client could authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys, which is extremely rare. [CVE-2015-0205] By modifying the contents of the signature algorithm or the encoding of the signature, it is possible to change the certificate's fingerprint. This does not allow an attacker to forge certificates, and does not affect certificate verification or OpenSSL servers/clients in any other way. It also does not affect common revocation mechanisms. Only custom applications that rely on the uniqueness of the fingerprint (e.g. certificate blacklists) may be affected. [CVE-2014-8275] IV. Workaround No workaround is available. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 8.4 and FreeBSD 9.3] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-9.3.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-9.3.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssl-9.3.patch.asc [FreeBSD 10.0] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-10.0.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-10.0.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssl-10.0.patch.asc [FreeBSD 10.1] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-10.1.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:01/openssl-10.1.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssl-10.1.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r276865 releng/8.4/ r277195 stable/9/ r276865 releng/9.3/ r277195 stable/10/ r276864 releng/10.0/ r277195 releng/10.1/ r277195 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.1 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUtuEaAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnQCcP/A19v5HUUhjz5nMbUumRwAmB QCxNKEy6SbAuxtIwGNYJyyxKIK3R9vTHwlgyQZVb4q8FgMHcu4yABeRfov10mO5Q U7RkLOJyca6eqEngkrh+AFfbhqfxtccIMUQkDdegsQcqZd2Ya0VeNfjA8H0XIDoL JSEoCifmxjv6v8ZcpugahsUOBmEWx+vyHJUSPVSv/AsLubzV3hqi4iLpzLky3/dR 4LHGzPny07NkGPVqOBU7mjTs76SzCTS2c4NIVfvbphx8UojMvREbZ8ogCMEVGBXY fIWesi7Y6lhqbSgWj1EXyZF9NTo/Z4nr7Oh1ER5VSAfmhZAdyhEEEGQrg4Jq0VL3 DJ1Y35Up79xXmVjB14COxodI5UO+55wWnXb8r/zy/eh+wv0sHwlTz56wxo7SxAOa xOrQj0VJ7zghLhBO7azacbVYIKpfQkJafb7XRUOqu4wt2y3/jeL+0UkWJnNMROrq aQUB6SdGUVDwQsmodgF0rsGcQYXhaQBPu4KQo8yG8+rpqc2zewi537BJr/PWJvH0 sJ6yYcD7VGyIleVRDpxsg7uBWelnGn+AqHignbyUcic4j/N9lYlF00AVgka2TdOp i5eZtp7m95v53S4fEX2HGwWpOv+AfCrSKQZGpvdNx+9JyD3LyOvFBxs4k0oZWa6J 6FLFZ38YkLcUIzW6I6Kc =ztFk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Tue Jan 27 19:55:08 2015 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 19:55:08 GMT Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem Message-ID: <201501271955.t0RJt8WC055452@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: SCTP SCTP_SS_VALUE kernel memory corruption and disclosure Category: core Module: sctp Announced: 2015-01-27 Credits: Clement LECIGNE from Google Security Team and Francisco Falcon from Core Security Technologies Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p5) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p17) 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p9) 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p23) CVE Name: CVE-2014-8612 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background SCTP protocol provides reliable, flow-controlled, two-way transmission of data. It is a message oriented protocol and can support the SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET abstractions. SCTP allows the user to choose between multiple scheduling algorithms to optimize the sending behavior of SCTP in scenarios with different requirements. II. Problem Description Due to insufficient validation of the SCTP stream ID, which serves as an array index, a local unprivileged attacker can read or write 16-bits of kernel memory. III. Impact An unprivileged process can read or modify 16-bits of memory which belongs to the kernel. This smay lead to exposure of sensitive information or allow privilege escalation. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:02/sctp.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:02/sctp.patch.asc # gpg --verify sctp.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r277807 releng/8.4/ r277808 stable/9/ r277807 releng/9.3/ r277808 stable/10/ r277807 releng/10.0/ r277808 releng/10.1/ r277808 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References We would like to acknowledge Clement LECIGNE from Google Security Team and Francisco Falcon from Core Security Technologies who discovered the issue independently and reported to the FreeBSD Security Team. The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.1 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUx+qPAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rndPwQAJYuUZhkBqt6Lj0Wnuu220QL OwMQAVBDggfNMJj5GCMRYqniARGg53UpzBjbKyen9N7tQtjgF6ll9EcWQhUdQSSl 07iCLGkn7kAu5jRO7+S/fJLXaUBfo+KfrUakHBdrWGKD0VVp/DDMbjbzZWl8Yw0S 7g0tqSmNcR1uUbAAsSXUfN9N/8OZzkqCiDvmVcFtalw1CjFyl6XbYXxNS+/j7LrU YQBJdz9F/X/oPe19VQ36olZWzTdlSLwa/ylwNW7O6K5NdoCq73Co4IDL0gkAgtdQ s4A7h4UwEoYleRRX+g9Rbeq2tz9FwfIwSferFRF5/1thc0cVJ2e/oDq9lmzyepwa rbH8jy/TMtSKHlali8I3w6KYfqRFs6whS9Bud1b0SgrqqZizsO64BbvSzkELxHJl PMUPHHCh3w0CXnRcaxC+rY/kazPZeRzebMaxQLAV0KTEVp0aSGw7FBtEE+ldrHUd rp1bLESjTjtagr1K1UsCKKZr/t9RSHSZ1I6vfxBPUsUu7oUgd+aOmEpiyYKxna0y vS5ECCrJG4k9fsQ1emyB5NhROYCXdq2CavfWWOOi3LoUhVvh34N27HVZlqv2m3Y9 sM20xOB3dSx3ufsv19nAclVpL76Pu7fD/MNe+lhUk1KKgqx0L7vdiJfMIrafLYsR V2Rre46fapln8T+wvhQP =o9yw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Tue Jan 27 19:55:12 2015 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 19:55:11 GMT Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:03.sctp Message-ID: <201501271955.t0RJtB8U055486@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:03.sctp Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: SCTP stream reset vulnerability Category: core Module: sctp Announced: 2015-01-27 Credits: Gerasimos Dimitriadis Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p5) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p17) 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p9) 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p23) CVE Name: CVE-2014-8613 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background SCTP protocol provides reliable, flow-controlled, two-way transmission of data. It is a message oriented protocol and can support the SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET abstractions. II. Problem Description The input validation of received SCTP RE_CONFIG chunks is insufficient, and can result in a NULL pointer deference later. III. Impact A remote attacker who can send a malformed SCTP packet to a FreeBSD system that serves SCTP can cause a kernel panic, resulting in a Denial of Service. IV. Workaround On FreeBSD 10.1 or later systems, the system administrator can set net.inet.sctp.reconfig_enable to 0 to disable processing of RE_CONFIG chunks. This workaround is not available on earlier FreeBSD releases, but systems that do not serve SCTP connections are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:03/sctp.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:03/sctp.patch.asc # gpg --verify sctp.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r277807 releng/8.4/ r277808 stable/9/ r277807 releng/9.3/ r277808 stable/10/ r277807 releng/10.0/ r277808 releng/10.1/ r277808 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.1 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUx+qbAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnR98QAOWIIf7+akuopMxuVnppZKub DKCgVAJznitKoxnBtYMAOTcKdf65dQqaAgznAWBRo+USue5LIOI0jjgLuQgepoG6 eIosPiRXqvMQL6Qqx8ydwM3xiVQd+b9pMiLkh3cfljr1Oh6OV+YSRXC+HBKZXaR6 sn5kHRR7xFiwV/HsX4RoSik3qPbDl1x66jeN5jL0Wqg2qjCagK6OxGOtkIlt3pDj QrYNX/l20hXmvPjRojSEPhY+52X29/nlQjfJg/pwpsmiZJe3cqmfsh1aceUOH1Tu BOVxwE3oYWrJ8NZBa2cKReU1Sdvl1FxtlaXwkE+sRBzh1/vA7AZU6jWL7fEV1wv0 2mZYLoCrSHfBongLMohs4DQ8CCnH3iEoUBRbG9HGwlAh4s9CAre87oIdHHFWRSsg oIHxNDG+lk+yNJuOKfjDT+poyuYw7TlBfYN+ifO5UHPOEIH430FWF3B3P2oH4I/M 7VQRClaxaNiPfAJxa11IwHKWM12yrrM7483AuPqdd1r9OUnx33y1jPY0ByemXv9d LE8jJXs0cdR7zCJuV9R8Uif9xkdGLTj9emsqjaS1KxSJrSzPJaah4nkWq8BRmMXK 3xOxlIM/cGJLU+/cliDy3CqHipU4pt+S4RuAB41xx2k5g9YiAMH178xrfOgrklSH xKfAM/gz4YqESK5QPjqO =859G -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----