From security-advisories at freebsd.org Tue Apr 8 23:34:13 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 23:34:13 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl
Message-ID: <201404082334.s38NYDxr098590@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-04-08
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-04-08 18:27:39 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-08 18:27:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p1)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p4)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p11)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p8)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p15)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0076, CVE-2014-0160
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the
usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a
basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
OpenSSL uses the Montgomery Ladder Approach to compute scalar multiplication
in a fixed amount of time, which does not leak any information through timing
or power.
II. Problem Description
The code used to handle the Heartbeat Extension does not do sufficient boundary
checks on record length, which allows reading beyond the actual payload.
[CVE-2014-0160]. Affects FreeBSD 10.0 only.
A flaw in the implementation of Montgomery Ladder Approach would create a
side-channel that leaks sensitive timing information. [CVE-2014-0076]
III. Impact
An attacker who can send a specifically crafted packet to TLS server or client
with an established connection can reveal up to 64k of memory of the remote
system. Such memory might contain sensitive information, including key
material, protected content, etc. which could be directly useful, or might
be leveraged to obtain elevated privileges. [CVE-2014-0160]
A local attacker might be able to snoop a signing process and might recover
the signing key from it. [CVE-2014-0076]
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not use OpenSSL to implement
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
protocols implementation and do not use the ECDSA implementation from OpenSSL
are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 8.x and FreeBSD 9.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 10.0]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in .
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
IMPORTANT: the update procedure above does not update OpenSSL from the
Ports Collection or from a package, known as security/openssl, which
has to be updated separately via ports or package. Users who have
installed security/openssl should update to at least version 1.0.1_10.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r264285
releng/8.3/ r264284
releng/8.4/ r264284
stable/9/ r264285
releng/9.1/ r264284
releng/9.2/ r264284
stable/10/ r264266
releng/10.0/ r264267
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Tue Apr 8 23:34:12 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 23:34:12 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver
Message-ID: <201404082334.s38NYChp098556@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:05.nfsserver Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Deadlock in the NFS server
Category: core
Module: nfsserver
Announced: 2014-04-08
Credits: Rick Macklem
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-04-08 18:27:39 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-08 18:27:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p1)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p4)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p11)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p8)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p15)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-1453
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
The Network File System (NFS) allows a host to export some or all of its
file systems so that other hosts can access them over the network and mount
them as if they were on local disks. FreeBSD includes both server and client
implementations of NFS.
II. Problem Description
The kernel holds a lock over the source directory vnode while trying to
convert the target directory file handle to a vnode, which needs to be
returned with the lock held, too. This order may be in violation of normal
lock order, which in conjunction with other threads that grab locks in the
right order, constitutes a deadlock condition because no thread can proceed.
III. Impact
An attacker on a trusted client could cause the NFS server become deadlocked,
resulting in a denial of service.
IV. Workaround
Systems that do not provide NFS services are not vulnerable. Neither
are systems that do but use the old NFS implementation, which is the
default in FreeBSD 8.x.
To determine which implementation an NFS server is running, run the
following command:
# kldstat -v | grep -cw nfsd
This will print 1 if the system is running the new NFS implementation,
and 0 otherwise.
To switch to the old NFS implementation:
1) Append the following lines to /etc/rc.conf:
nfsv4_server_enable="no"
oldnfs_server_enable="yes"
2) If the NFS server is compiled into the kernel (which is the case
for the stock GENERIC kernel), replace the NFSD option with the
NFSSERVER option, then recompile your kernel as described in
.
If the NFS server is not compiled into the kernel, the correct
module will be loaded at boot time.
3) Finally, reboot the system.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:05/nfsserver.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:05/nfsserver.patch.asc
# gpg --verify nfsserver.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot the
system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r264285
releng/8.3/ r264284
releng/8.4/ r264284
stable/9/ r264285
releng/9.1/ r264284
releng/9.2/ r264284
stable/10/ r264266
releng/10.0/ r264267
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 9 01:06:32 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 01:06:32 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl [REVISED]
Message-ID: <201404090106.s3916Wiw035439@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-04-08
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-04-08 18:27:39 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-08 18:27:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p1)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p4)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p11)
2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p8)
2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p15)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0076, CVE-2014-0160
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
0. Revision History
v1.0 2014-04-08 Initial release.
v1.1 2014-04-08 Added patch applying step in Solutions section.
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the
usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a
basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
OpenSSL uses the Montgomery Ladder Approach to compute scalar multiplication
in a fixed amount of time, which does not leak any information through timing
or power.
II. Problem Description
The code used to handle the Heartbeat Extension does not do sufficient boundary
checks on record length, which allows reading beyond the actual payload.
[CVE-2014-0160]. Affects FreeBSD 10.0 only.
A flaw in the implementation of Montgomery Ladder Approach would create a
side-channel that leaks sensitive timing information. [CVE-2014-0076]
III. Impact
An attacker who can send a specifically crafted packet to TLS server or client
with an established connection can reveal up to 64k of memory of the remote
system. Such memory might contain sensitive information, including key
material, protected content, etc. which could be directly useful, or might
be leveraged to obtain elevated privileges. [CVE-2014-0160]
A local attacker might be able to snoop a signing process and might recover
the signing key from it. [CVE-2014-0076]
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not use OpenSSL to implement
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
protocols implementation and do not use the ECDSA implementation from OpenSSL
are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 8.x and FreeBSD 9.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 10.0]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in .
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
IMPORTANT: the update procedure above does not update OpenSSL from the
Ports Collection or from a package, known as security/openssl, which
has to be updated separately via ports or package. Users who have
installed security/openssl should update to at least version 1.0.1_10.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r264285
releng/8.3/ r264284
releng/8.4/ r264284
stable/9/ r264285
releng/9.1/ r264284
releng/9.2/ r264284
stable/10/ r264266
releng/10.0/ r264267
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 30 04:35:11 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 04:35:10 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:07.devfs
Message-ID: <201404300435.s3U4ZAfe093748@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:07.devfs Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: devfs rules not applied by default for jails
Category: core
Module: etc_rc.d
Announced: 2014-04-30
Affects: FreeBSD 10.0
Corrected: 2014-04-30 04:03:05 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:04:42 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p2)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-3001
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
The device file system, or devfs(5), provides access to kernel's device
namespace in the global file system namespace.
The devfs(5) rule subsystem provides a way for the administrator of a system
to control the attributes of DEVFS nodes. Each DEVFS mount-point has a
``ruleset'', or a list of rules, associated with it, allowing the
administrator to change the properties, including the visibility, of certain
nodes.
II. Problem Description
The default devfs rulesets are not loaded on boot, even when jails are used.
Device nodes will be created in the jail with their normal default access
permissions, while most of them should be hidden and inaccessible.
III. Impact
Jailed processes can get access to restricted resources on the host system.
For jailed processes running with superuser privileges this implies access
to all devices on the system. This level of access could lead to information
leakage and privilege escalation.
IV. Workaround
Systems that do not run jails are not affected.
The system administrator can do the following to load the default ruleset:
/etc/rc.d/devfs onestart
Then apply the default ruleset for jails on a devfs mount using:
devfs -m ${devfs_mountpoint} rule -s 4 applyset
Or, alternatively, the following command will apply the ruleset over all devfs
mountpoints except the host one:
mount -t devfs | grep -v '^devfs on /dev ' | awk '{print $3;}' | \
xargs -n 1 -J % devfs -m % rule -s 4 applyset
After this, the system administrator should add the following configuration
to /etc/rc.conf to make it permanent, so the above operations do not have
to be done each time the host system reboots.
devfs_load_rulesets="YES"
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:07/devfs.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:07/devfs.patch.asc
# gpg --verify devfs.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# install -o root -g wheel -m 444 etc/defaults/rc.conf /etc/defaults/
Follow the steps described in the "Workaround" section, or reboot the
system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/10/ r265122
releng/10.0/ r265124
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 30 04:35:11 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 04:35:10 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp
Message-ID: <201404300435.s3U4ZACm093738@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:08.tcp Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: TCP reassembly vulnerability
Category: core
Module: inet
Announced: 2014-04-30
Credits: Jonathan Looney
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-04-30 04:04:20 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:05:47 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p9)
2014-04-30 04:05:47 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p16)
2014-04-30 04:04:20 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:05:47 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p5)
2014-04-30 04:05:47 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p12)
2014-04-30 04:03:05 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:04:42 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p2)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-3000
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) of the TCP/IP protocol suite
provides a connection-oriented, reliable, sequence-preserving data
stream service. When network packets making up a TCP stream (``TCP
segments'') are received out-of-sequence, they are maintained in a
reassembly queue by the destination system until they can be re-ordered
and re-assembled.
II. Problem Description
FreeBSD may add a reassemble queue entry on the stack into the segment list
when the reassembly queue reaches its limit. The memory from the stack is
undefined after the function returns. Subsequent iterations of the
reassembly function will attempt to access this entry.
III. Impact
An attacker who can send a series of specifically crafted packets with a
connection could cause a denial of service situation by causing the kernel
to crash.
Additionally, because the undefined on stack memory may be overwritten by
other kernel threads, while extremely difficult, it may be possible for
an attacker to construct a carefully crafted attack to obtain portion of
kernel memory via a connected socket. This may result in the disclosure of
sensitive information such as login credentials, etc. before or even
without crashing the system.
IV. Workaround
It is possible to defend to these attacks by doing traffic normalization
using a firewall. This can be done by including the following /etc/pf.conf
configuration:
scrub in all
This requires pf(4) to be enabled, and have the mentioned configuration
loaded.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:08/tcp.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:08/tcp.patch.asc
# gpg --verify tcp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot the
system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r265123
releng/8.3/ r265125
releng/8.4/ r265125
stable/9/ r265123
releng/9.1/ r265125
releng/9.2/ r265125
stable/10/ r265122
releng/10.0/ r265124
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 30 04:35:11 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 04:35:10 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl
Message-ID: <201404300435.s3U4ZAXt093746@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL use-after-free vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-04-30
Affects: FreeBSD 10.x.
Corrected: 2014-04-30 04:03:05 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:04:42 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p2)
CVE Name: CVE-2010-5298
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
OpenSSL context can be set to a mode called SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS, which
requests the library to release the memory it holds when a read or write buffer
is no longer needed for the context.
II. Problem Description
The buffer may be released before the library have finished using it. It is
possible that a different SSL connection in the same process would use the
released buffer and write data into it.
III. Impact
An attacker may be able to inject data to a different connection that they
should not be able to.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not use OpenSSL to implement
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
protocols, or not using SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS and use the same process
to handle multiple SSL connections, are not vulnerable.
The FreeBSD base system service daemons and utilities do not use the
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode. However, many third party software uses this
mode to reduce their memory footprint and may therefore be affected by this
issue.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:09/openssl.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:09/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/10/ r265122
releng/10.0/ r265124
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Apr 30 19:06:30 2014
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 19:06:30 GMT
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl [REVISED]
Message-ID: <201404301906.s3UJ6UDk017107@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:09.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL use-after-free vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-04-30
Affects: FreeBSD 10.x.
Corrected: 2014-04-30 04:03:05 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-04-30 04:04:42 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p2)
CVE Name: CVE-2010-5298
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
0. Revision History
v1.0 2014-04-30 Initial release.
v1.1 2014-04-30 Added patch applying step in Solutions section.
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
OpenSSL context can be set to a mode called SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS, which
requests the library to release the memory it holds when a read or write buffer
is no longer needed for the context.
II. Problem Description
The buffer may be released before the library have finished using it. It is
possible that a different SSL connection in the same process would use the
released buffer and write data into it.
III. Impact
An attacker may be able to inject data to a different connection that they
should not be able to.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not use OpenSSL to implement
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
protocols, or not using SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS and use the same process
to handle multiple SSL connections, are not vulnerable.
The FreeBSD base system service daemons and utilities do not use the
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode. However, many third party software uses this
mode to reduce their memory footprint and may therefore be affected by this
issue.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:09/openssl.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:09/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in .
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/10/ r265122
releng/10.0/ r265124
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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