Intrusion Detection using pkg?

[Matthew Seaman]

On 2016/04/18 11:43, Vsevolod Stakhov wrote:
> I don't like this idea: if an attacker has enough power to modify files
> on FS why he or she cannot do the same for checksums in pkg database? We
> need digital signatures and password protected private key. Then a user
> can type something like:

Uh, yes.  That's pretty much exactly what I'm suggesting.

> pkg sign <- enter private key password
> 
> followed by:
> 
> pkg sign --check to verify the existing checksums

This user interface would work for me.

> Unfortunately, after years of useless discussion we have no sane
> signatures scheme in pkg, and I have no desire to continue these
> discussions I'm afraid.

I believe the current package signature stuff serves its purpose, which
is to verify that the package tarball in question originated from an
identified and trusted source and hasn't subsequently been tampered
with.  Which is fine, but there's a definite use-case for going further...

	Cheers,

	Matthew


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