Any workarounds for Verisign .com/.net highjacking?

[John Polstra]

On 17-Sep-2003 M. Warner Losh wrote:
> In message: <XFMail.20030916170025.jdp at polstra.com>
>             John Polstra <jdp at polstra.com> writes:
>: On 16-Sep-2003 M. Warner Losh wrote:
>: > I think we should put a filter for this nonsense into the base
>: > system.  Hack the resolve to filter out the adddress, and hack bind to
>: > filter it out too.  that way we can leverage our position in the name
>: > servers in the world to do something about this BS.
>: 
>: I think so too, in principle.  But we need something better than a
>: hard-coded IP address.  It would take Verisign about an hour to figure
>: out they need to change the address frequently.  (Well, OK, a day ...
>: it's Verisign, after all.)
> 
> Agreed.  but it wouldn't be too hard to determine at boot/hourly doing
> a bogus query to find the address of the moment.  Even they would be
> hard pressed to change things more than hourly.

True, we could probably do it.  I guess we'd have to generate a few
random and unlikely queries, try them, and see if all/most of them
resolve to the same address.  Or maybe the to the same small set of
addresses, depending on how determined Verisign is to make this work.

I just _love_ how Verisign doesn't even have a reverse DNS record for
that address.  Jerks.

I sincerely hope that for once, the herds of cattle who use AOL and
MSN and think "internet" and "web" are synonyms will realize this just
ain't right and raise a fuss about it.  But given their meek response
to spam, pop-ups, and spyware, I'm not all that optimistic.

John