Cryptographically enabled ports tree.

[Colin Percival]

At 09:24 23/06/2003 +0200, William Fletcher wrote:
>No use signing if cvsup is a mess.

   False.  If the ports tree is signed, people can verify its integrity 
regardless of how they obtain it.

>We need cvsup-ssl, Then, all the big security guys need to do
>is provide a public key for the cvsup-mirrors, which then get
>the public key for the big cvsup server, etc.
>
>That way, cvsup is secure, and we can trust it.

   Not good enough.  Cvsup-ssl would secure the cvsup process itself, but 
it would not protect against a malicious or damaged cvsup mirror.  We need 
end-to-end signing -- the ports tree should be signed on freefall or 
cvsup-master, and verified by the end users.

Colin Percival