default value of security.bsd.hardlink_check_[ug]id

[Ceri Davies]

On Sat, Dec 30, 2006 at 09:08:42PM -0800, Colin Percival wrote:
> FreeBSD Architects,
> 
> I'd like to make security.bsd.hardlink_check_[ug]id default to 1, starting
> with FreeBSD 7.x.  This would make it impossible for a user to create a hard
> link to a file which he does not own.
> 
> Any objections?

One here, on the grounds that:

 a) you have provided no rationale;
 b) that sysctl does not currently seem to be documented anywhere, so
     changing its default value would violate POLA.

There is a longer answer in which I pine after Solaris' privileges(5)
again, or wonder if this can be implemented for "system" processes only
using the new priv(9) API instead.

Ceri
-- 
That must be wonderful!  I don't understand it at all.
                                                  -- Moliere
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