From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:45 2009
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed Jun 10 10:41:55 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd
Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAfjtR025312@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: ntpd stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: ntpd
Announced: 2009-06-10
Credits: Chris Ries
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11)
CVE Name: CVE-2009-1252
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP)
used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time
source.
Autokey is a security model for authenticating Network Time Protocol
(NTP) servers to clients, using public key cryptography.
II. Problem Description
The ntpd(8) daemon is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow when it is
configured to use the 'autokey' security model.
III. Impact
This issue could be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the context of
the service daemon, or crash the service daemon, causing denial-of-service
conditions.
IV. Workaround
Use IP based restrictions in ntpd(8) itself or in IP firewalls to
restrict which systems can send NTP packets to ntpd(8).
Note that systems will only be affected if they have the "autokey" option
set in /etc/ntp.conf; FreeBSD does not ship with a default ntp.conf file,
so will not be affected unless this option has been explicitly enabled by
the system administrator.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4,
7.1, and 7.2 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 6.3]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd63.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd63.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 6.4 and 7.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:11/ntpd.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/ntp/ntpd
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
# /etc/rc.d/ntpd restart
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.8.3
RELENG_6_4
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.8.1.2.2
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.20.2
RELENG_7
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.3
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.2.2.1
RELENG_7_1
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10
src/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_crypto.c 1.1.1.3.18.1.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/6/ r193893
releng/6.4/ r193893
releng/6.3/ r193893
stable/7/ r193893
releng/7.2/ r193893
releng/7.1/ r193893
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1252
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:11.ntpd.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkovjOwACgkQFdaIBMps37KRpwCfaQF9q8KhElv6LqgFv3DX2h9c
hbEAn2Q0X8Qv8r5OySnhlAw2pMxlxkXK
=Mh2u
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:49 2009
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed Jun 10 10:42:17 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6
Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAfn6R025354@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6 Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Missing permission check on SIOCSIFINFO_IN6 ioctl
Category: core
Module: netinet6
Announced: 2009-06-10
Credits: Hiroki Sato
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
IPv6 is a new Internet Protocol, designed to replace (and avoid many of
the problems with) the current Internet Protocol (version 4). Many
properties of the FreeBSD IPv6 network stack can be configured via the
ioctl(2) interface.
II. Problem Description
The SIOCSIFINFO_IN6 ioctl is missing a necessary permissions check.
III. Impact
Local users, including non-root users and users inside jails, can set
some IPv6 interface properties. These include changing the link MTU
and disabling interfaces entirely. Note that this affects IPv6 only;
IPv4 functionality cannot be affected by exploiting this vulnerability.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems without local untrusted users
are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4,
7.1, and 7.2 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 6.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6-6.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6-6.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 7.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:10/ipv6.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.13
RELENG_6_4
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.12.2.2
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.51.2.11.2.1
RELENG_7
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.7
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.6.2.2
RELENG_7_1
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10
src/sys/netinet6/in6.c 1.73.2.4.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/6/ r193893
releng/6.4/ r193893
releng/6.3/ r193893
stable/7/ r193893
releng/7.2/ r193893
releng/7.1/ r193893
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:10.ipv6.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkovjOUACgkQFdaIBMps37IFxwCgj0o1r4IQMIEvp3y4oIqhQwxe
cI8AoIlxweqjakKxu/A/Z4+xjoGmqUdF
=/kNi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Jun 10 10:41:56 2009
From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories)
Date: Wed Jun 10 10:42:33 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe
Message-ID: <200906101041.n5AAfsTT025407@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Local information disclosure via direct pipe writes
Category: core
Module: kern
Announced: 2009-06-10
Credits: Pieter de Boer
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p1)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p6)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.4-STABLE)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_4, 6.4-RELEASE-p5)
2009-06-10 10:31:11 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p11)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit .
I. Background
One of the most commonly used forms of interprocess communication on
FreeBSD and other UNIX-like systems is the (anonymous) pipe. In this
mechanism, a pair of file descriptors is created, and data written to
one descriptor can be read from the other.
FreeBSD's pipe implementation contains an optimization known as "direct
writes". In this optimization, rather than copying data into kernel
memory when the write(2) system call is invoked and then copying the
data again when the read(2) system call is invoked, the FreeBSD kernel
takes advantage of virtual memory mapping to allow the data to be copied
directly between processes.
II. Problem Description
An integer overflow in computing the set of pages containing data to be
copied can result in virtual-to-physical address lookups not being
performed.
III. Impact
An unprivileged process can read pages of memory which belong to other
processes or to the kernel. These may contain information which is
sensitive in itself; or may contain passwords or cryptographic keys
which can be indirectly exploited to gain sensitive information or
access.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users
are not vulnerable. System administrators are reminded that even if a
system is not intended to have untrusted local users, it may be possible
for an attacker to exploit some other vulnerability to obtain local user
access to a system.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_7_2, RELENG_7_1, RELENG_6_4, or RELENG_6_3 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3, 6.4,
7.1, and 7.2 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:09/pipe.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:09/pipe.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.5
RELENG_6_4
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.40.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.18.2.11
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.4.2.2
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.16
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.15
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.184.2.2.6.2
RELENG_7
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.5
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.4
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.5
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.3.4.2
RELENG_7_1
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.9
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.10
src/sys/kern/sys_pipe.c 1.191.2.3.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/6/ r193893
releng/6.4/ r193893
releng/6.3/ r193893
stable/7/ r193893
releng/7.2/ r193893
releng/7.1/ r193893
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:09.pipe.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkovjN0ACgkQFdaIBMps37JkXwCgmLcEMOMAEIXRoJ220zwZhMKn
f+gAn1bZyLMhfZU7TI0xxhizwetDwMVI
=J37B
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From deb at freebsdfoundation.org Wed Jun 17 18:57:36 2009
From: deb at freebsdfoundation.org (Deb Goodkin)
Date: Wed Jun 17 20:28:11 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] Foundation Project Announcement
Message-ID: <4A393C9B.1090607@freebsdfoundation.org>
Dear FreeBSD Community,
The FreeBSD Foundation is pleased to announce another funded project!
Mark Linimon has been awarded a grant to prototype a new problem
reporting system for the FreeBSD project. This project will allow Mark
to define the features, look-and-feel, and architecture of a future
replacement of the project's current GNATs based system. Once the
prototype is complete, it will be used to garner input from the FreeBSD
community before a production system is implemented.
"One of the most frequently requested improvements from the FreeBSD
developer community is an improved bug tracking system," said Mark
Linimon. He also added, "The design goals of this prototype are
to incorporate such features as markedly improved workflow, better
categorization, customizable email notifications, and redesigned web
pages to make searching and browsing easier."
"Once the prototype is completed," Mark added, "it will be circulated
amongst the developer community for feedback. I am happy to have the
Foundation's support to work on this project."
"Problem reporting software is a critical tool for getting feedback
from the FreeBSD user community, recording information about defects
and missing features in the system, and making our volunteer developers
productive," said Justin Gibbs, Founder of the FreeBSD Foundation.
"Mark has used manpower and sheer will to overcome the deficiencies
in the current problem reporting system, and to make it work for the
project. But our GNATs isn't fully utilized because of missing features
and a clumsy user interface. We're very excited to help address these
problems in a core piece of the FreeBSD project's infrastructure."
This project will be completed by the end of June.
Sincerely,
The FreeBSD Foundation
From errata-notices at freebsd.org Wed Jun 24 05:44:24 2009
From: errata-notices at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Errata Notices)
Date: Wed Jun 24 05:44:46 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-09:02.bce
Message-ID: <200906240544.n5O5iORB050583@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-09:02.bce Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: bce(4) does not work with lagg(4) LACP mode
Category: core
Module: sys/dev
Announced: 2009-06-24
Credits: Pete French
David Christensen
Affects: FreeBSD 7.2
Corrected: 2009-05-20 21:13:49 (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-24 05:28:09 (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p2)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
.
I. Background
bce(4) is a network device driver for Broadcom NetXtreme II
(BCM5706/5708/5709/5716) PCI/PCIe Gigabit Ethernet adapters. The
lagg(4) driver is a pseudo network interface driver which allows
aggregation of multiple network interfaces as one virtual interface
for the purpose of providing fault-tolerance and high-speed links.
II. Problem Description
The bce(4) driver used an incorrect total packet length calculation. This
bug was accidentally added just after 7.1-RELEASE.
III. Impact
When adding a bce(4) interface on the system as a lagg(4) member with
the LACP aggregation protocol enabled network communication via the
bce(4) interface stops completely. Although the bce(4) interface
works if it is not a lagg(4) member, the incoming traffic statistics
which can be found in netstat(1) output will be incorrect because
every packet is recognized as full-sized one.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or to the RELENG_7_2
security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.2 system.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:02/bce.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:02/bce.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot
the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_7
src/sys/dev/bce/if_bce.c 1.34.2.8
src/sys/dev/bce/if_bcereg.c 1.16.2.3
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.5
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.6
src/sys/dev/bce/if_bce.c 1.34.2.7.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/7/ r192477
releng/7.2/ r194808
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-09:02.bce.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkpBu9cACgkQFdaIBMps37IyrgCeKorJrpSXubynKzNJ2ld4j1K3
RqoAnAjhR8Fld9c8gJUIP/BuQ0wx2atT
=oSkz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From errata-notices at freebsd.org Wed Jun 24 05:44:27 2009
From: errata-notices at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Errata Notices)
Date: Wed Jun 24 05:44:48 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-09:03.fxp
Message-ID: <200906240544.n5O5iRNE050599@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-09:03.fxp Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Poor TCP performance of fxp(4)
Category: core
Module: sys/dev
Announced: 2009-06-24
Credits: Bjoern Koenig
Pyun YongHyeon
Affects: FreeBSD 7.2
Corrected: 2009-05-07 01:14:59 (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-24 05:28:09 (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p3)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
.
I. Background
fxp(4) is a network device driver which provides support for Ethernet
adapters based on the Intel i82557, i82558, i82559, i82550, and i82562
chips. It supports TCP segmentation offload (TSO) for IPv4 on i82550
and i82551.
II. Problem Description
When a TSO option is enabled, fxp(4) always sets the length of outgoing IP
packets as the interface MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit). This could
could cause the packet to be lost when the TCP receiver advertises a smaller
MSS (Maximum Segment Size) than the interface MTU on the sender side.
III. Impact
TCP connections via fxp(4) can cause significantly poor performance
when the TSO option is enabled due to packet loss. Note that the loss
depends on the receiver side's MSS.
IV. Workaround
Disable TSO of fxp(4) interfaces on your system. There are two ways
to do this:
(disable TSO of a specific interface; "fxp0" in the below example)
# ifconfig fxp0 -tso
(disable TSO of all interfaces on the system)
# sysctl net.inet.tcp.tso=0
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or to the RELENG_7_2
security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.2 system.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:03/fxp.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:03/fxp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
and reboot
the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_7
src/sys/dev/fxp/if_fxp.c 1.266.2.15
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.5
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.6
src/sys/dev/fxp/if_fxp.c 1.266.2.14.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/7/ r191867
releng/7.2/ r194808
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-09:03.fxp.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkpBvA0ACgkQFdaIBMps37IKbACfdnwjftNf/f/3c+hvxOKGz7eg
osQAmwRaCBV/a2A3Pdxt/FxGwg+bHXM7
=rUkc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
From errata-notices at freebsd.org Wed Jun 24 05:44:30 2009
From: errata-notices at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Errata Notices)
Date: Wed Jun 24 05:44:49 2009
Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-09:04.fork
Message-ID: <200906240544.n5O5iTDA050615@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-09:04.fork Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Deadlock in a multi-threaded program during fork(2)
Category: core
Module: libc
Announced: 2009-06-24
Credits: Konstantin Belousov ,
Max Brazhnikov
Affects: FreeBSD 7.2
Corrected: 2009-05-03 17:51:38 (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-06-24 05:28:09 (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p2)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
.
I. Background
fork(2) is a system call which causes creation of a new process.
FreeBSD supports invoking the malloc(3) function during the fork(2) in
a process running in threaded mode which involves locking of the memory
allocator.
II. Problem Description
A lock order reversal has been found in the interaction between the
malloc(3) implementation and threading library. When a multi-threaded
process calls the fork(2) system call in a thread and the malloc(3)
function in another thread it can cause a deadlock in the child
process.
III. Impact
A multi-threaded program that calls fork(2) in a thread and malloc(3)
in another thread can make the child process stop unintentionally.
There is no direct impact on the other processes or the kernel.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or to the RELENG_7_2
security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.2 system.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:04/fork.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-09:04/fork.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/libc
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_7
src/lib/libc/stdlib/malloc.c 1.147.2.7
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.5
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.6
src/lib/libc/stdlib/malloc.c 1.147.2.6.2.2
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/7/ r191767
releng/7.2/ r194808
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-09:04.fork.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAkpBvBsACgkQFdaIBMps37LnLQCeNw8Es9R9X8QySoZni2JQ9Kma
N+8An3Ff/bB4l3dvgfAa0rAA+TjbfQBV
=8YtE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----